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INTRODUCTION
On March 19, 1990 a program written by three hackers1 en-
tered dozens of computers hooked to Internet, an international
Generally, a hacker is a person who illegally and without authorization gains ac-
cess to a computer system. See generally Cangialosi, The Electronic Underground: Com-
puter Piracy and Electronic Bulletin Boards, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 265
(1989).
A hacker also has been defined as "a person who enjoys learning the details of com-
puter systems and how to stretch their capabilities," and "one who programs enthusiasti-
cally." Bloombecker, Computer Crime Update: The View as We Exit 1984, 7 W. NEW
ENG. L. REv. 627, 629 n.2 (1985) (quoting STEELE, WOODS, FINKEL, CRISPiN, STALLMAN, &
GOODFELLOW, THE HACKER'S DICTIONARY 79-80 (1984).
Additionally, a hacker has been described as a "cracker" who breaks into high secur-
ity computer systems for fun and to look around. Cangialosi, supra, at 269-70.
A hacker is also "a person who is not trying to learn about computers in a meaning-
ful manner, but rather by trial and error." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF COM-
PUTER TERMS 168 (3d. ed. 1988) [hereinafter COMPUTER DICTIONARY].
Although no universal definition of a hacker exists, a hacker has been described as a
male, usually juvenile, and almost always under the age of 25. A hacker is relatively
intelligent, shy, and quiet. Relatively few females have been caught hacking, one excep-
tion is Susan Headley, also known as "Susan Thunder." Bloombecker, supra, at 630-631,
n.12.
Once in the system the hacker may browse, change or delete files, disable the system
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network. The program stole electronic documents containing
users' passwords and erased files to keep itself undetected.3
On April 2, 1990, three Australians were arrested on charges
of tampering with Internet computers linked in the United
States and Australia.4 Australian Federal Police made the ar-
rests as a result of an investigation initiated in 1988 in coopera-
tion with United States authorities.5
Computer specialists are disturbed because the hacking in-
by introducing a program such as a virus, or steal funds or other goods by electronic
transfer. See generally Schulkins, The Electronic Burglar, 1 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 140
(1985); Cangialosi, supra; Soma, Smith and Sprague, Legal Analysis of Electronic Bulle-
tin Board Activities, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 571 (1985) [hereinafter Soma].
Hacking also includes computer aided abuse, theft of computer time, or software
piracy. Computer aided abuse includes theft of money or other property by means of a
computer. See Becker, Rifkin: A Documentary History, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 471 (1980);
PREVENTION COMMITTEE, PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICACY, COMPUTERS:
CRIMES, CLUES AND CONTROLS 10 (1986) [hereinafter PREVENTION COMMITTEE].
An example of theft of computer time is when an employee uses a company com-
puter to store personal data. See A. BEQUAI, HOW TO PREVENT COMPUTER CRIME 20
(1983).
Software piracy is the illegal copying of computer programs for sale or personal use.
This concerns the copyright aspects of computer crime. See Brown, International
Trends in Computer Program Protection, 3 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 157 (1987).
Computer hacking is characterized as a computer crime, as well as a white-collar
crime. See generally L. SIEGAL, CRIMINOLOGY 369-71 (2d. ed. 1986). Siegal defines white-
collar crime as "the illegal activities of people and institutions whose acknowledged pur-
pose is profit and gain through legitimate business transactions." Id. at 367. This defini-
tion would encompass thefts of money by computerized transfers, computer time (i.e.,
Lexis and Westlaw), and computer data. See Note, Who is Calling Your Computer
Next? Hacker!, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 89, 92 (1985) (authored by Diana Smith).
White-collar crime has also been defined as "any illegal act characterized by deceit
and concealment and not dependent on the direct application of physical force." A. BE-
QUAI, COMPUTER CRIME 1 (1976). [hereinafter COMPUTER CRIME]. This definition would
encompass the unauthorized access component of hacking because the hacker does not
physically confront his victims; he gains illegal access via telephone lines. See also D.
PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER (1976).
Markoff, Computer System Intruder Plucks Passwords and Avoids Detection,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1990, at A12, col. 4 [hereinafter Password Plucker].
Among the institutions penetrated were the Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Harvard University, the Digital Equipment Corporation, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories, Boston University, New York University, the University of Texas and
Belicore, a telephone research laboratory. Markoff, Arrests in Computer Break-Ins Show
a Global Peril, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1990, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter Global Peril].
See infra note 21, for definition of a network.
' Password Plucker, supra note 2.
' Global Peril, supra note 2.
" Id.
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cident raises "troubling questions about the vulnerability of
technology to intruders operating beyond American borders and
laws.".. "Any computer that is connected to a telephone or any
computer that is connected to a computer network is vulnerable.
It doesn't matter what continent they are on."7
The Australian Federal Police said that while they knew
about the illegal hacking activities since 1988, they could not be-
gin their investigation until July, 1989 when legislation covering
computer crimes became effective in Australia.8 Under the stat-
ute, it is a crime to break into computer systems located any-
where in the world from telephones or computer links originat-
ing in Australia.9
The police maintain the hackers spent up to sixteen hours
per day for approximately two years perfecting their craft of ille-
gally entering computers.' ° One of the hackers even boasted to
The New York Times, in an anonymous telephone call, that he
had broken into Internet in order- to taunt security specialists
who denounced such activities." Although security experts gen-
erally deplore the act of hacking, one benefit that arose from the
Australian incident is that the break-ins uncovered previously
unknown security flaws in the computer systems. 2
*Id.
* Id. This statement was made by Peter Neumann, a computer scientist at SRI In-
ternational, a research center in Menlo Park, California. Id.
8 Id. at A16. At the time this Article went to press, another international hacking
incident presented itself illustrating the dilemma when countries do not have anti-hack-
ing statutes. The New York Times reported on April 21, 1991 that a group of Dutch
hackers had been breaking into United States military computers for almost six months.
The computers penetrated were all linked to the Internet network, as with the Austra-
lian incident. Markoff, Dutch Computer Rogues Infiltrate American Systems With Im-
punity, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1991, at Al, col. 5 [hereinafter Dutch Rogues]. The hackers
actions did not cause serious damage and no arrests were made because there are no
legal restrictions in the Netherlands barring hacking. Id.
9 Id. at Al.
10 Global Peril, supra note 2, at A16.
" Id. See also C. STOLL, THE CUCKOO's EGG: TRACKING A SPY THROUGH THE MAZE OF
COMPUTER ESPIONAGE 354 (1990).
" Global Peril, supra note 2, at A16. Uncovering of security flaws in computer sys-
tems has sparked a debate over whether hackers should be considered criminals. In Com-
puter Ethics: Cautionary Tales and Ethical Dilemmas in Computing by Tom Forester
and Perry Morrison, a section is entitled "Hackers: Criminals or Modern-Day Robin
Hoods?" The authors argue that hackers should not be treated as criminals for exposing
security flaws in systems required to be secure (for example data bases which contain
personal information on individuals). The authors also offer that the Chaos Computer
[Vol. 3:199
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The Australian hacking incident illustrates not only the vul-
nerability of computer security, but also serves as a prototype
representing an entire hacking phenomenon. The hacking inci-
dent also demonstrates the need for international measures and
legislation-both domestic and international-aimed at punish-
ing, and perhaps preventing, global hacking.13
The Australian hacking incident further is demonstrative of
a large-scale problem arising from the failure of legal systems to
keep pace with rapid advancements in technology. Aside from
the issue of hacking, it has been reported that facsimile ma-
chines, commonly known as fax machines, have been hacked
from around the globe."
Section I of this Comment defines hacking and discusses
how it is accomplished. Section II analyzes international legal
problems and approaches associated with global hacking. Sec-
tion III discusses the two approaches used in domestic law. Sec-
tions IV through VI offer specific analysis of legal measures ad-
Club, a hacker group, released more information about the USSR Chernobyl nuclear
disaster than did the West German government. FORESTER & MORRISON, COMPUTER ETH-
ICS: CAUTIONARY TALES AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN COMPUTING 49-50 (1990). See also
Schwartz, Hackers of the World Unite, NEWSWEEK, July 2, 1990, at 36.
" This Australian incident is not the first time hacking has crossed international
borders. In Regina v. Turner, 27 B.L.R. 207 (1984, Ont. H.C.) aff'd Ont C.A. (February
14, 1985) cited in MANN, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW IN CANADA 171 (1987),
hackers accessed a Milwaukee Corporation's computer from Toronto and disabled it so
the Corporation could not access any data stored in the system.
Also, a group called the Chaos Computer Club of Hamburg, West Germany was able
to access 135 computer systems worldwide, extracting information about the space shut-
tle, Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars), and other NASA projects. Marbuck, Hack-
ing Through NASA: A Threat or Only an Embarrassment, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1987, at
38; Cangialosi, supra, note 1, at 270.
"4 Cullison, Fax Machines Become an Open Book To Hackers' Prying Eyes, Chicago
Tribune, Sept. 9, 1990 at lC [hereinafter Prying Eyes]; Cullison, Warning: 'Fax Hack-
ers' Can Silently Steal Your Business Messages, The Stamford Advocate, Sept. 9, 1990,
at El, col. 1; Hillkirk, The Fax of the Matter: It Can Be Intercepted, USA Today, Octo-
ber 19, 1989, at B1.
[Alnyone with a little knowledge of electronics can tap fax messages being
sent from one of these relatively unsophisticated machines to another, with the
duplication printed out on the pirate's facsimile machine. Both the sender and the
receiver of the faxed document remain completely unaware that they have been
bugged.
Prying Eyes, supra, at llC.
The facsimile hacking phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article, however, the
issues of facsimile and computer hacking are essentially similar and both need to be
addressed on a global scale.
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dressing hacking in Canada, the United States and the United
Kingdom. Finally, Section VII offers potential solutions to the
hacking crisis.
I. THE PROCESS OF COMPUTER HACKING
A. Finding and Penetrating Computer Systems
Basically, there are two types of computer systems: "closed"
and "remote."' 5 A "closed" system has separate terminals. 6
These terminals are directly "hard-wired"17 to a central main-
frame computer 8 located in the same facility as the terminals.
The "closed" system cannot be accessed 8 from outside com-
puters, thus neither authorized nor unauthorized outside users
can "log on." 20
" These terms are the author's generalization for this article. See generally R.
WALKER, UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER SCIENCE-VOL. 11 (1985); A. BEQUAI, HOW TO PREVENT
COMPUTER CRIME (1983) [hereinafter PREVENTION].
"6 A terminal is "[a] keyboard/display of keyboard/printer device used to input pro-
grams and data to the computer and to receive output from the computer." COMPUTER
DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 378.
There are two types of terminals: a smart terminal and a dumb terminal. A smart
terminal is "[a] terminal that contains some capacity to process information being trans-
mitted or received." Id. at 348.
A dumb terminal is "[a] visual display terminal with minimal input/output capabili-
ties and no processing capabilities." Id. at 121.
" "Hard wired" means a "physical connection of two pieces of electronic equipment
by means of a cable" or wire. Id. at 170.
"8 A mainframe computer is:
A large, expensive computer generally used for information processing in large
businesses, colleges, and organizations. Originally, the phrase referred to the ex-
tensive array of large rack and panel cabinets that held thousands of vacuum
tubes in early computers. Mainframes can occupy an entire room and have very
large data-handling capacities. They are far more costly than microcomputers or
minicomputers. Mainframes are the largest, fastest and most expensive class of
computers. (Supercomputers are the largest, fastest and most expensive of the
mainframes).
Id. at 225.
' For outside access, the mainframe must be equipped with a modem. A modem is
basically a device that enables computers to communicate with each other. A modem is
"[an acronym for MOdulator/DEModulator, a device that translates digital pulses from
a computer into analog signals for telephone transmission, and analog signals from the
telephone into digital pulses the computer can understand. The modem provides com-
munication capabilities between computer equipment over common telephone facilities."
14. at 241.
'o To be "Logged on" a computer basically means to have accessed the computer via
a terminal. Logging in is "[t]he process of establishing communication with and verifying
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/8
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Similar to the "closed" system, the "remote" system also
has terminals that may be hard-wired to the mainframe. But
what distinguishes the "closed" and "remote" systems is the "re-
mote" system's capability to be linked 21 with computers outside
the facility.22 Basically, this connection is accomplished when
the outside computer sends a signal by modem23 to the "remote"
system.
Of the two systems, the "remote" is more common because
the "remote" can perform business functions such as: electronic
fund transfers;24 electronic mail;25 providing up-to-date informa-
tion on stock quotes;26 and office work can be done at home.2 7
the authority to use the computer during conversational programming." Id. at 214.
In rare cases, the information from these closed systems can be assessed by unautho-
rized users through the use of an electromagnetic pickup. These pickups intercept radia-
tion generated by the closed computer and converts that radiation into readable data
which another computer system can understand. This detection can not be accomplished
through phone lines. PREVENTION, supra note 15, at 23.
21 A link is "[in data communications, a physical connection between one location
and another whose function is to transmit data." Id. at 211.
A link is usually achieved through the use of telephone lines and networks. A net-
work is "(1) A system of interconnected computer systems and terminals. (2) A series of
points connected by communications channels. (3) The structure of relationships among
a project's activities, tasks and events." Id. at 253.
See also INTERNATIONAL BusINESS MACHINES CORP., COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS CON-
CEPTS (1977); W. BARDEN, JR., NETWORK PRIMER (1986); G. FRIEND, J. FIKE, H. BAKER, & J.
BELLAMY, UNDERSTANDING DATA COMMUNICATIONS (1984) [hereinafter FRIEND]; WANG
LABORATORIES, INC., THE WANG PROFESSIONAL COMPUTER: NETWORK USER GUIDE (2d ed.
1984); A. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS (1981).
22 Most often, personal computers are used to link to computers from outside of its
facility. A personal computer is "[a] moderately priced microcomputer system intended
for personal use rather than commercial purposes." COMPUTER DICTIONARY, supra note 1,
at 279.
2" See supra note 19 for definition of "modem."
" Electronic fund transfers (EFT) are "[a] cashless method of paying for goods or
services. Electronic signals between computers are used to adjust the accounts of the
parties involved in a transaction." COMPUTER DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 128. An exam-
ple of an EFT is direct deposit of a paycheck to an employee's bank account.
2" Electronic mail is "[tihe process of sending, receiving, storing, and forwarding
messages in digital form over telecommunication facilities." Id. at 128.
See also COMPUSERVE INC., COMPUSERVE INFORMATION SERVICE: USERS GUIDE § 4
(1986) [hereinafter USERS GUIDE]; C. BOWEN & D. PEYTON, HOW TO GET THE MOST OUT
OF COMPUSERVE 42-47 (3d ed. 1987).
26 Corporations can check a particular stock quote through services such as Com-
puServe. See USERS GUIDE, supra note 25, at § 7; BOWEN & PEYTON, supra note 25, at
285-91.
2" To work from home, an employee needs a computer and a modem to access the
business system and a password. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
7
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Furthermore, "remote" systems also are used internationally by
governments to send information to other countries. Such infor-
mation can include data pertaining to air transport control or
meteorological weather.2"
B. The Complexities Behind Detection and Prosecution
As evidenced by the recent hacking arrests in Australia,
hacking is a time-consuming process.2 9 Because it takes consid-
erable time for hackers to penetrate a system, the owners of the
system are lulled into a false belief that their system is secure.30
The considerable time element involved in hacking a system
might also foster a misconception that hackers are easily tracea-
ble because they continuously dial a telephone number and at-
tempt to achieve access.3' An explanation of how hacking is ac-
complished will further illustrate why these beliefs are false.
The initial step in accessing a remote system is for a hacker
to discover the system's telephone number. Knowledge of the
system's telephone number is achieved by using a program
called a "random number generator" 32 or by manually dialing
random numbers until a computer system is contacted. Hackers
also obtain telephone numbers from Bulletin Board Services
(BBS).33
Second, after obtaining a viable telephone number, the
28 INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON PUBLIC POLICY, ISSUES IN CANADIAN/U.S. TRANSBORDER
COMPUTER DATA FLOWS 40 (W.E. Cundiff & M. Reid ed. 1979).
29 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
" See generally FORESTER & MORRISON, supra note 12, at 40-67; COMPUTER CRIME,
supra note 1, at 13; J. CARROLL, COMPUTER SECURITY 251 (1977).
"1 See supra text accompanying note 10 as an example of the time element.
2 A random number generator is either written by a hacker or purchased. A random
number generator is "[a] computer program or hardware designed to produce a pseudo
random number or series of pseudo random numbers according to specified limitations."
COMPUTER DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 310.
"' These BBS hacker boards are widespread. See SOMA, supra note 17; Cangiolosi,
supra note 1.
The BBS is a public or private service used to exchange messages or software and is
set up and run by a systems operator or SYSOP. The BBS is "[a] computer system that
allows users to post messages or programs for other users." COMPUTER DICTIONARY, supra
note 1, at 36.
An example of a large commercial BBS is CompuServe, but there are also many
small, private services available. Estimates say there are approximately 3500-4500 pri-
vate services. Cangiolosi, supra note 1, at 266.
[Vol. 3:199
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hacker' must connect his modem with the modem of the system
being accessed. During the connection process, time-consuming
errors may cause the hacker to have to backtrack to re-entering
the system's telephone number.s"
After the modems finally connect, the hacker's third task is
to discover a password or user code 3 of an authorized user.
Again, this is an additional time-consuming step because secure
computer systems have multiple-level passwords and often auto-
matically terminate the phone/modem connection3 after a des-
ignated number of incorrect passwords have been entered.37
The hacking problem is compounded because many coun-
tries do not have laws addressing the phenomenon. 8 This lack
of legal protection leads hackers to believe they will escape pros-
ecution and thus are not deterred from their intrusive activi-
" Errors occur when information is transmitted via telephone lines and the errors
prohibit the transfer of understandable information. FRIEND, supra note 21, at 5-4.
Errors occur if the "protocols" or "parameters", as well as other variables, of the
system the hacker is attempting to access are not matched with his own system.
Protocols are a "[s]et of rules or conventions governing the exchange of information
between computer systems." COMPUTER DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 304.
Parameters are "[a]n arbitrary constant. A variable in an algebraic expression that
temporarily assumes the properties of a constant." Id. at 273. Examples of parameters
are stop bits, baud rate, etc. See BOWEN & PAYTON, supra note 25, at 18.
" The password or user code, is the secret, special word, code, or symbol that
must be presented to the computer system to gain access to its resources. It is
used for identification and security purposes on a computer system. Each user is
assigned a specific set of alphanumeric characters to gain entrance to the entire
computer system or to parts of the system.
COMPUTER DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 276.
The hacker, in order to access the system must use an authorized user's password or
user code. Use of this code by the hacker can prevent the authorized user from gaining
access to the system. See generally Schulkins, supra note 1.
Similar to the random number generator, a random character generator program can
be purchased or written by a hacker. The latter program enters letters and numbers in
an attempt to discern the user's access code. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
36 If the telephone/modem connection is terminated, the hacker must re-dial the
telephone number and enter a different access code. Statutes in some countries and
within the United States criminalize telephone harassment. These statutes have been
used to prosecute hacking offenses. These statutes typically prevent repeated re-dialing
of a telephone number if no legitimate purpose of communication is intended, whether
or not conversation occurs. Soma, supra note 1, at 575.
", Schulkins, supra note 1, at 140.
" See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 10
COMPUTER RELATED CRIME: ANALYSIS OF LEGAL POLICY (1986) [hereinafter OECD].
9
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ties.39 Fortunately for the Internet computer users in the United
States, Australia's statute enabled the perpetrators to be
brought to justice."'
Even when hacking victims are fortunate enough to have a
remedy via statute, prosecution of hacking offenses may still be
problematic. First, many hackers are juveniles and thus are im-
mune from prosecution.4 1 Second, detecting some hacking of-
fenses is difficult and sometimes impossible. 4' Finally, a reluc-
tance frequently exists on the part of victims of hacking to
report the crime.43
'9 Hackers believe that they will not be subject to prosecution. This is evidenced
from the statement of the Australian hacker who said he did not believe he was chargea-
ble with a felony for his actions. Global Peril, supra note 2, at A16. This belief by hack-
ers may be justified if they hack from nations without specific anti-hacking legislation as
evidenced from the most recent Dutch incident. See Dutch Rogues, supra note 8.
40 Global Peril, supra note 2, at A16. Unfortunately for the United States Internet
users however, the Netherlands does not have an anti-hacking statute under which the
Dutch hackers can be brought to justice. Thus, they are hacking with impunity. Dutch
Rogues, supra note 8.
" Bloombecker, supra note 1, at 640. Some have advocated punishment of these
juveniles by confiscating their computer equipment, or by penalizing their parents
through tort or criminal liability for not adequately supervising their children's hacking
activities with the computer which the parents probably purchased. Id. at 636. See also
Soma, supra note 1, at 576-77.
42 One reason why detection is often hindered is that the hacker will use a valid
password to access the system thus, it will appear as if an authorized user logged on.
PREVENTION, supra note 15, at 22. Also, as illustrated by the Australian case, a clever
hacker can create a program to conceal his unauthorized access. Password Plucker,
supra note 2, at A12.
" Reluctance to report can-be attributed to the fact that harm was minimal, embar-
rassment that a security lapse existed or fear of a repeat situation by "copy-cats" who
heard of the incident through the media and believe the target to be easy. H.R. Rep. No.
894, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3689, 3697.
Reported computer crime has been referred to as "the tip of the iceberg." Schulkins,
supra note 1, at 140. This is evidenced by the 1984 survey conducted by the American
Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section Task Force On Computer Crime. MANN, COM-
PUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW IN CANADA 156 (1987) (citing Task Force on Computer
Crime, Report on Computer Crime (American Bar Association, June, 1984)). The survey
was distributed to 1,000 of the United States largest corporations and government agen-
cies. Of the 1,000, only 283 responded. Of the respondents, twenty five percent acknowl-
edged a known and verifiable loss due to computer crime in the preceding twelve
months. The twenty five percent figure is computed from seventy-two of the 275 who
responded to that particular question. Id. Of those twenty five percent, the majority had
suffered losses in the range up to $100,000. Wasik, Surveying Computer Crime, I COM-
PUTER L. & PRAC. 110, 111 (1985). Eighteen cases reported higher losses. Id. And one case
reported a loss between $100 million and $500 million. Id.
However, only about one-third of those who were victims of computer crime in this
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/8
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II. INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES APPLYING TO HACKING OFFENSES
A. The Non-Presence of a Hacker
Computer hacking is a crime unlike any other under inter-
national law. Under a normal scenario, a person commits a crim-
inal act in the country where he is physically present. For exam-
ple, if A were to commit a bank robbery in Country X, he would
have to be in X to commit the offense. This would mean that
Country X would have jurisdiction in investigating A's crime
and bringing A to trial in state X, or it could return A to his
home country."'
Hacking is a unique offense in that A may commit a bank
robbery by computer in Country X while he is physically present
in his home, Country Y. The bank robbery could be accom-
plished if the hacker illegally accessed a bank in Country X and
transferred funds from an account in Country X's bank into his
own bank in Country Y. This presents an immediate problem to
Country X in obtaining jurisdiction over A and in investigating
his crime."' The following sections discuss the status of the indi-
vidual under international law, extradition, the double criminal-
ity standard, and treaties on mutual assistance.
B. International Law and the Individual
Historically, sovereign states, rather than individuals, were
the main subject of international law.' 6 Since World War II,
however, the individual is properly considered subject to the ju-
survey had reported the crime to law enforcement authorities. Id.
In other statistics, it has been estimated that only one in 100 computer crimes are
detected, only one in five that are detected are reported, and only one in 100 are prose-
cuted. MANN, supra at 157.
" INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 335-341
(V. Nanda & M. Bassiouni ed. 1987). The returning of an individual to his native coun-
try ensues only when an extradition treaty exists between the native country and the
nation where a crime is allegedly committed. Id. at 339.
" See supra text accompanying note 5 where the United States had to rely upon
Australian police to investigate the crime.
11 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 104 (Bassiouni & Nanda ed. 1973)
[hereinafter TREATISE].
Jessup writes, "international law or the law of nations must be defined as law appli-
cable to states in their mutual relations and to individuals in their relations with states."
JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 17-18 (1948) quoted in HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER &
SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 352 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter HENKIN].
1991]
11
PACE Y.B. INT'L L.
risdiction of international law. 7 Hence, an individual can be
deemed to be in violation of international law, regardless of
whether punishment is rendered by the states, individually, or
by international courts."' However, in order for an individual to
be liable under international law, the person must commit an
offense defined under customary international principles, be
they norms or treaties.49
Hacking poses a problem in the international community
because there is no customary principle outlawing it.50 Because
the offense is relatively new, no international norms exists con-
cerning hacking and there are no treaties, conventions or United
Nations Resolutions directly pertaining to the computer crime.5
As a result, hacking offenses must be attacked solely through do-
mestic legislation. Thus, an individual cannot be subject to in-
ternational sanctions as a result of hacking; for domestic reme-
dies are all that is available. Consequently, tensions exist in
obtaining cooperation among states to ensure that domestic
anti-hacking statutes are enforced.
C. Extradition Treaties, Double Criminality and the Hacker
One such tension spurs from extradition treaties. Such trea-
ties provide the legal arrangement between party states for
bringing an alleged criminal within the jurisdiction of the court
17 TREATISE, supra note 46, at 104-05. "It was Hefter who first pointed out that man,
irrespective of nationality, had rights and duties inherent in human nature and he was
therefore not only a subject of international law but also a member of the international
community." Id. at 104.
48 Id. at 106. Individuals can be tried in international tribunals of competent juris-
diction. An example of how individuals can be hauled into court can be found with the
prosecution of Nazi war criminals in the Nuremberg Trials at a special tribunal estab-
lished for the purpose of such prosecutions. International Military Tribunal (Nurem-
berg) Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172-75, 220-21 (1946), reprinted in
HENKIN, supra note 46, at 360-63.
" TREATISE, supra note 46, at 107. Customary international law can be a norm of
international law generally recognized as a crime by the international community, or it
may be codified in the form of a bilateral treaty or multilateral convention. Id. at 106-07.
" See supra note 38.
" Cf., Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter Convention
for Data Protection]. (The convention does not directly apply to hacking, but may indi-
rectly apply).
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that renders the verdict as to his crime. Extradition treaties
can provide for broad extradition powers or, in the alternative,
they can specify limited circumstances and offenses that are
extraditable.53
Double criminality is a basic principle under international
extradition law.5 4 Double criminality means that "an act is not
extraditable unless it constitutes a crime under the laws of both
the state requesting extradition and the state from which extra-
dition is requested." 55 Double criminality is vital in ensuring
that a defendant's liberty is not restricted because of offenses
not recognized as criminal in the state receiving the extradition
request.56
Double criminality appears in one of two forms in extradi-
tion treaties. The traditional and most common form is where
states limit extraditable offenses to those punishable under the
laws of both states by a specified minimum term of imprison-
ment.5 7 The second form, similar to the first form, limits the of-
fense, but it also includes a particular list of non-extraditable
offenses.58
The principle of double criminality poses a problem to pun-
ishing hacking on an international level. For hacking is not
treated the same in all countries, and some countries have no
laws addressing the computer violation.5 9 Therefore, a loophole
exists. If a hacker were to be a national and a resident of a coun-
try that does not have an anti-hacking law, it is possible that he
could hack across international borders and be spared from ex-
tradition to the country whose computers were accessed.60
52 TREATISE, supra note 46, at 138. "Extradition is the surrender of an individual
accused or convicted of a crime by the state within whose territory he is found to the
state under whose laws he is alleged to have committed or to have been convicted of the
crime." HENKIN, supra note 46, at 885.
53 See generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE 336-63 (Nanda & Bassiouni ed. 1987) [hereinafter Nanda & Bassiouni].
'4 Id. at 365. See also HENKIN, supra note 46, at 886.
" Nanda & Bassiouni, supra note 53, at 365 (citing SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 137 (1971)).
11 Nanda & Bassiouni, supra note 53, at 365.
57 Id. at 366.
58 Id.
59 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
60 OECD, supra note 38, at 68.
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D. Mutual Assistance and the Hacker
Treaties on mutual assistance address law enforcement and
allow governments to go directly to other countries to seek assis-
tance in gathering information." Similar to extradition treaties,
mutual assistance treaties may include limitations excluding the
investigation of specified offenses."2 Furthermore, some mutual
assistance treaties apply the double criminality principle in that
only offenses that are crimes in both countries can be mutually
investigated.
As applied to hacking, mutual assistance treaties can be
paramount in international cooperation in punishing the offend-
ers. As previously asserted, the hacker is usually in another
country when he inflicts his damage. Therefore, the damaged
country has no choice but to rely on the investigatory authorities
of the hacker's home country."
However, because mutual assistance treaties generally do
not list hacking as an included offense and because hacking is
not illegal in some countries, there are limits on the effectiveness
of these treaties in punishing offenders. 5 Theoretically, a clever
hacker can evade jurisdiction by knowing the laws of where he
does his deed.
o] Nanda & Bassiouni, supra note 53, at 233-34.
[Tlhe treaties provide for a broad range of assistance in criminal matters,
including: (1) executing requests relating to criminal matters, (2) taking testimony
or statements of persons, (3) effecting the production, preservation and authenti-
cation of documents, records, or articles of evidence, (4) returning to the request-
ing party any objects, articles or any other property or assets belonging to it or
obtained by the accused through criminal offenses, (5) serving judicial documents,
writs, summonses, records of judicial verdicts and court judgments or decisions,
(6) effecting the appearance of a witness or expert before a court of the requesting
party, (7) locating persons, and (8) providing judicial records, evidence and
information.
Id. at 236.
62 Id. at 238-39. For example, judicial assistance may be refused when the execution
of the request would prejudice the security or other essential interests of the state receiv-
ing the request. Also, some treaties deny assistance when the offense is purely militaiy or
political. Id. at 238.
' Id. at 236 n.10.
' An example of how a victimized country had no choice but to rely upon the inves-
tigatory authorities of another nation is found with the Australian incident, where
United States officials were at the mercy of Australian officials to track down the hackers
in Australia. See supra text accompanying note 5.
" See supra text accompanying note 60.
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III. DOMESTIC LAW AND THE HACKER: THE "ENDS" AND
"MEANS" APPROACHES
Due to the lack of international cooperation in appre-
hending and prosecuting hackers, domestic law is the sole source
of bringing hackers to justice. Therefore, what follows is an ex-
amination into the treatment of hacking by domestic legal
systems.
In general, countries approach computer hacking differ-
ently 66 depending upon what actions are taken by the hacker
when a system is accessed. The "ends" approach to computer
hacking is when a country elects not to pass specific legislation
prohibiting unauthorized access to a computer, based on the
view that the computer is merely an instrument for committing
an already illegal offense." Basically, the "ends" of a hacker's
conduct are illegal regardless of how the end result was
achieved.68
In contrast, the "means" approach to hacking criminalizes
"mere" access to a computer system without authorization. 9
Under the "means" approach, it is of no consequence whether
an additional illegal act results from the unauthorized access. 0
Although "ends" and "means" approaches hinge upon oppo-
site foundations, the element of property is a common thread.
66 Some countries are reluctant to modify existing laws to encompass computer
crime either because the country has not experienced computer crime or it has deter-
mined the economic impact is too speculative and unknown. OECD, supra note 38, at 12.
Other countries are more concerned with software piracy rather than unauthorized ac-
cess. Id.
"7 The "ends" countries do not distinguish between information and computerized
information. Their main concerns are computer security and compensation for damage
done to private assets. Id.
" OECD members who have adopted the "ends" approach are Belgium, Iceland,
and Japan. Id.
6 Id. at 12, 61. Examples of specific computer statutes are found in the United
States, Canada and the United Kingdom. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030 (1988); Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985, Act of June 20 1985, ch. C-19, §
301.2, 1985 Can. Stat. 272 (Unauthorized Use Of Computer); Computer Misuse Act,
1990, ch. 18 (LEXIS, International library, U.K. file). See Appendix for full text of Com-
puter Misuse Act.
" OECD, supra note 38, at 12. Two attitudes exist behind the "means" approach.
The first is to amend existing law provisions in order to encompass hacking. The second
is to establish new incriminations to add the computer dimension. These two attitudes
are not mutually exclusive. Id.
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Prior to advancements in computer technology, existing laws of-
fered adequate protection against the theft of information."
This protection stemmed from the fact that in order to steal in-
formation, the medium upon which it was written also had to be
stolen.7 The advent of computers, however, created a new prob-
lem encompassing the theft of information absent the theft of
the medium.
In countries that take the "ends" approach to computer
hacking,74 the property law element is glossed over in that com-
puter data is deemed property.7 5 In contrast, countries that at-
tack the "means" of computer hacking reject the concept that
computer data is property. "Means" countries statutorily attack
the act of hacking in order to fill a void in inadequate property
laws, such as those pertaining to theft and forgery, which the
courts interpret not to protect information.78
Three common law countries illustrating the two ap-
proaches to hacking and the property dilemma are Canada, the
United States and the United Kingdom. 77 While all three coun-
tries have specific computer statutes attacking the "means" of
hacking, only Canada and the United States combat the "ends"
as well. What follows is an analysis of the strengths and down-
falls of each nation's approach.
IV. CANADA'S APPROACH TO HACKING
Canada takes both an "ends" and "means" approach to
hacking, thus providing a strong statutory system against hack-
ing on a domestic level.78 Canadian law attacks the "ends" of
71 OECD, supra note 38, at 29.
72 Id.
" Id. Another problem existing between the information/medium dichotomy occurs
with the admissibility of computer records as proof of their contents. MANN, supra note
43, at 179-80.
7' See supra note 68 for a list of countries that follow the "ends" approach.
5 OECD, supra note 38, at 12.
7' For example, some cases in New York have held that computer-stored informa-
tion is not property that can be stolen. Sokolik, Computer Crime-The Need for Deter-
rent Legislation, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 353, 376 (1980).
17 The following analysis will be limited to federal legislation because even though
local legislation exists against hacking such local legislation does not apply internation-
ally. See generally Soma, supra note 1; MANN, supra note 13.
78 This is according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
[Vol. 3:199
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/8
1991] COMPUTER HACKING
hacking through recently amended criminal statutes that regard
computer data as property capable of being stolen. 9 Canadian
law also attacks the "means" of hacking by criminalizing them
under the Criminal Code section enacted in 1985 titled, Unau-
thorized Use of a Computer."
A. "Ends" Approaches
1. Theft Under the Criminal Code
The Theft Section, section 283 of the Criminal Code,81 pro-
vides, "everyone commits ... theft who ... converts to his use
• ..anything whether animate or inanimate."82 The words "ani-
mate or inanimate" clearly cover tangible and intangible prop-
erty and thus enable charges to be brought against hackers8 3
who print or save data84 from illegally accessed systems.
Although no hacking cases have been considered under this
section, one Canadian case applied the section to the copying of
computer programs. In Regina v. Tannas,8 5 the defendant was
charged with theft when he converted for his use, computer pro-
grams belonging to his former employer, Dome Petroleum."
ment. OECD, supra note 38, at 14.
" See infra notes 81-102 and accompanying text.
80 See generally MANN, supra note 43, at 160-73.
81 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, § 283(1) provides:
283 (1) Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right
takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use
of another person, anything whether animate or inanimate, with intent,
(a) to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it or a person who
has a special property or interest in it, of the thing or of his property or
interest in it,
(b) to pledge it or deposit it as security,
(c) to part with it under a condition with respect to its return that the
person who parts with it may be unable to perform, or
(d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot be restored in the condi-
tion in which it was at the time it was taken or converted.
Id.
82 Id.
's MANN, supra note 43, at 160-61.
84 For example, the hacker could "download" the program to his own disk drive.
"Download" is defined as "the process of transferring data from a large central computer
system to a smaller, remote computer system." COMPUTER DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at
118.
Alta. Q.B. (1984); cited in, MANN, supra note 43, at 163.
" MANN, supra note 43, at 163.
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Although the jury found the defendant not guilty, 7 presiding
Judge Bracco instructed the jury that computer software and
the information contained on it were included in the phrase
"anything that can be taken or converted. '88
Tannas is significant for its underlying principle that the
Canadian courts are willing to apply property laws to computer
offenses.
2. Mischief Under the Criminal Code
Section 387(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code8 e makes it a
crime to destroy or damage property, render property useless or
inoperative or interfere with the lawful use or enjoyment of
property. This section was applied to hackers in the case of Re-
gina v. Turner.s°
Turner involved hackers who accessed, from Toronto, the
computer of a Milwaukee corporation."' The hackers inserted
into the system a program that prevented the corporation's em-
ployees from gaining access to the stored information."
The hackers argued that section 387(1) did not apply to
their case because the statute was meant to cover real or tangi-
ble property.9 The court disagreed, holding that the statute
should be given its ordinary meaning.94 Further, because the
hackers made it impossible for the corporation to use or enjoy
" Id. at 164. Mr. Mann posits that this was because the prosecution did not prove
its case. Id.
I d.
8 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, § 387. The section provides:
387 (1) Every one commits mischief who willfully
(a) Destroys or damages property,
(b) renders property dangerous, useless, inoperative, or ineffective
(c) obstructs, interrupts, or interferes with the lawful use, enjoyment or op-
eration of property, or
(d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person in the lawful use,
enjoyment or operation of property.
Id.
90 27 B.L.R. 207 (Ont. H.C. 1984) aff'd Ont. C.A. (1985) cited in MANN, supra note
43, at 171.
91 MANN, supra note 43, at 171.
" Id. at 171-72.
" Id. at 172.
94 Id.
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its property, the court found the hackers guilty of mischief.98
Turner illustrates Canada's approach to property law as in-
cluding intangibles. After the Turner case, the Canadian legisla-
ture enacted an amendment to the statute, creating section
387(1.1), Mischief in Relation to Data, which in effect, codified
the Turner holding.96 This section prohibits the exact conduct in
Turner, that of destroying or rendering data meaningless." The
amendment also is significant because it illustrates Canada's
willingness to modify existing laws in order to accommodate
computer offenses and to eliminate ambiguities that the courts
may encounter.
3. Personation Under the Criminal Code
Section 361 of the Criminal Code,98 Personation with intent,
criminalizes impersonating someone for purposes of gaining an
advantage, such as obtaining property, or to disadvantage an-
other.9 The section potentially could be applied to a hacker who
uses an authorized user's password to access a system.1"'
Although no computer cases have been decided under this
section, an impressive argument can be made that use of a pass-
word gives the hacker an advantage by entering a computer,
while at the same time disadvantaging the authorized user by
95 Id.
" Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985, Act of June 20, 1985, ch. C-19 § 387(1.1),
1985 Can. Stat. 277. The section provides:
387 (1.1) Every one commits mischief who wilfully
(a) destroys or alters data;
(b) renders data meaningless, useless or ineffective;
(c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawful use of data; or
(d) obstructs, intercepts or interferes with any person in the lawful use of
data or denies access to data to any person who is entitled to access thereto.
Id.
97 Id.
98 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, § 361. The section provides:
361 Every one who fraudulently personates any person, living or dead,
(a) with intent to gain advantage for himself or another person,
(b) with intent to obtain any property or an interest in any property, or
(c) with intent to cause disadvantage to the person whom he personates or
another person
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.
Id.
" Id.
'00 MANN, supra note 43, at 169.
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locking that person out of the system." 1
Hypothetically, section 361 can be applied to the recent
Australian hacking case. The Australians used a special program
that stole and decoded passwords from a system file. Once de-
coded, the hackers used the passwords to access the files of au-
thorized users. 102
If the personation section were applied here, a conviction
could be secured under the theory that the hackers intended to
put the authorized users at a disadvantage when the hackers
viewed the users' personal files. At the same time, the hackers
intended to gain an advantage by using the password to enter
the system. Although the statute is readily applied to the Aus-
tralian case, it remains to be seen, whether Canada will apply it
to hacking in the future.
B. "Means" Approaches- Theft of Telecommunication Ser-
vice Under the Criminal Code
Prior to the enactment of stringent anti-hacking statutes,
Section 287(1)(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code, 03 Theft of
Telecommunication Services, was the sole governing authority
when it came to attacking the "means." Section 287(1)(b) states
it is theft if an unauthorized user "uses any telecommunication
facility or obtains any telecommunication service."104 The ques-
tion of whether a computer is a "telecommunication facility"
under section 287(1)(b) was addressed in Regina v. McLaugh-
lin'0 5 and was answered in the negative. 0 In McLaughlin, an
101 Id.
102 Password Plucker, supra note 2, at A12.
103 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, § 287(l)(b). The section provides:
287 (1) Every one commits theft who fraudulently, maliciously, or without color of
right,
(a) abstracts, consumes or uses electricity or gas or causes it to be wasted or
diverted or,
(b) uses any telecommunication facility or obtains any telecommunication
service.
(2) In this section and in section 287.1,
"telecommunication" means any transmission, emission or reception of signs, sig-
nals, writing, images or sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire or cable.
Id.
104 Id.
105 2 S.C.R. 331 (1980) cited in MANN, supra note 43, at 166.
106 Id.
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employee used a company computer for private purposes. 10 7
In determining that the company computer was not a "tele-
communication facility" under the statute, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that the purpose of a computer was not to chan-
nel information outside, as is the function of a "telecommunica-
tion facility." Rather, the court maintained that computers are
designed to retrieve and store information. s08 Hence, the mere
fact that the outside user in McLaughlin used telephone lines to
connect through a remote terminal'0 did not bring his conduct
within the ambit of the section."0
Consequently, it is evident that the 287(1)(b) method of at-
tacking the "means" to hacking was not without its loopholes.
The above case illustrates that a hacker is outside the bounda-
ries of prosecution under section 287(1)(b) unless the hacker ac-
tually devises a method to break into a telephone company net-
work and charge telephone time to someone's account. However,
quite often hackers do charge their intrusive activities to the ac-
counts of others in order to avoid considerable telephone bills
and to make tracing their telephone calls difficult."'
107 MANN, supra note 43, at 166.
See, e.g., A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIME 43 (1976). There two men had used their em-
ployer's computer to run their own music arranging business. The employees kept all of
the records of the business on the employer's computer. Id.
In McLaughlin, even though the employee had accessed the computer by telephone
like a hacker, access was authorized in that he used his own password. The difference
was, once accessed, he used the computer for a purpose not authorized by his employer.
MANN, supra note 43, at 166.
MANN, supra note 43, at 166.
100 See supra note 16 and accompanying text for definition of remote terminal.
"o MANN, supra note 43, at 166.
III For example, in the most recent Australian arrests, the hackers charged all the
long distance time to the accounts of the companies whose computers they had illegally
accessed. Global Peril, supra note 2.
Another example are "Phone Phreaks" defined as "someone who likes to play with
the phone system." Soma, supra note 1, at 573. Phreakers "specialize in using telephone
equipment for their own use, free of charge. Through devices (such as blue boxes), they
make toll-free calls around the world." Id.
Very often stolen credit card numbers or telephone account numbers are circulated
on hacker bulletin boards so hackers make thousands of calls at no personal cost. FOR-
ESTER & MORRISON, COMPUTER ETHICS: CAUTIONARY TALES AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN
COMPUTING 47 (1990).
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C. Filling Statutory Loopholes-Unauthorized Use of a Com-
puter Under the Criminal Code
To fill loopholes left by both "ends" and "means" statutes,
the Canadian Legislature in 1985 enacted legislation aimed at
the "means" of hacking. Section 301.2 of the Canadian Criminal
Code," 2 Unauthorized Use of a Computer, makes it illegal to ac-
cess a system without authorization. To date, no cases have been
decided under the statute.
One commentator explains, however, the elements necessary
to obtain a conviction under the statute."3 To obtain a convic-
,,2 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985, Act of June 20, 1985, ch. C-19, § 301.2,
1985 Can. Stat. 272. This section provides:
301.2 (1) Every one who, fraudulently and without colour of right,
(a) obtains, directly or indirectly, any computer service,
(b) by means of an electromagnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device,
intercepts or causes to be intercepted, directly or indirectly, any function of
a computer system, or
(c) uses or causes to be used, directly or indirectly, a computer system with
intent to commit an offence under paragraph (a) or (b) or an offence under
section 387 in relation to data or a computer system is guilty of an indicta-
ble offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten
years, or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
(2) In this section,
"computer program" means data representing instructions or statements
that, when executed in a computer system, causes the computer system to
perform a function;
"computer service" includes data processing and the storage or retrieval of
data;
"computer system" means a device that, or a group of interconnected or
related devices one or more of which,
(a) contains computer programs or other data, and
(b) pursuant to computer programs,
(i) performs logic and control, and
(ii) may perform any other functions;
"data" means representations of information or of concepts that are being prepared or
have been prepared in a form suitable for use in a computer system;
"electromagnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device" means any device or apparatus
that is used or is capable of being used to intercept any function of a computer system,
but does not include a hearing aid used to correct subnormal hearing of the user to not
better than normal hearing;
"function" includes logic, control, arithmetic, deletion, storage and retrieval and commu-
nication or telecommunication to, from or within a computer system;
"intercept" includes listen to or record a function of a computer system, or acquire the
substance, meaning or purport thereof.
Id.
11 MANN, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 173 (1987).
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tion, it must be demonstrated that a hacker acted "fraudulently
and without colour of right."11 4 To prove such conduct, evidence
must be introduced to show an intent to cause deprivation to
another person.115
Further "it will also be noted that what is prohibited under
paragraph 301.2(1)(a) is only the obtaining of a computer service
(for example, data processing or the storage or retrieval of data)
rather than the actual taking of computer data programs.'' 1
The section does not apply to "the retrieval of data belonging to
[an]other person."" However, 301.2(1)(b) applies to "[tihe use
of a device for the purpose of acquiring any data being commu-
nicated to, from or within a computer system . . . . This would
be the case whether or not any information is in fact 'taken.' "1 8
Therefore, this section purely attacks the "means" of computer
hacking. Unlike section 287, convictions obtained under
301.2(1)(a) and (b) do not depend upon whether telephone time
is illegally charged to the account of an unsuspecting victim.
The statutory sections specified above not only address the
"means" of hacking, they also attack the "ends" by stating that
it is illegal to destroy data as specified under Criminal Code sec-
tion 387.119 In addition, the statute includes a comprehensive list
of definitions that may be helpful in avoiding ambiguities in
court. Two such definitions include: "intercept"'12 and "Electro-
magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device."'1 2' Although it
remains to be seen if section 301.2 will be tested against hacking,
the all-encompassing nature of the statute's attack makes it a
powerful domestic weapon in Canada's arsenal against computer
crime.
In short, the Canadian Legislature aggressively combats the
hacking problem by taking both "ends" and "means" ap-
proaches. However, one significant flaw is that Canada's statu-
tory scheme fails to attack hacking on an international level. No
I14 Id.
Id.
"~ Id. at 174
"' Id. at 175.
1 Id.
See supra note 96; See also supra note 112.
12 See supra note 112.
1 Id.
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sections provide for territoriality, extradition or double criminal-
ity as suggested by the Organisation of Economic Control and
Development 22 and illustrated by the British Computer Misuse
Act of 1990.21 As the remaining sections of this Comment sug-
gest, providing international protection is feasible as well as ben-
eficial. Canada has the potential to reap benefits by adding stat-
utory provisions dealing with international hacking issues.
V. THE UNITED STATES
The United States, like Canada, approaches hacking by at-
tacking the "means." However, the United States launches a
more reserved domestic attack against hacking, as compared to
Canada, in that the United States fails to attack the "ends" of
hacking through modified property statutes. In addition, weak-
nesses exist with the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 24
the specific United States statute prohibiting hacking.
A. Past Prosecution
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, federal prosecutions were attempted under Federal
Wire Fraud; '25 Federal Mail Fraud; s12  and, Federal Criminal
Theft '27 statutes. All three are "ends" type statutes, and all were
minimally successful in obtaining computer crime convictions.
Each statute has its own pitfalls which impede the obtainment
of hacking convictions. One particular problem is that the Fed-
eral statutes require that the hacking occur across state lines.
Without this crossing of state boundaries, federal jurisdiction
could not be obtained, and the statutes would be rendered
inapplicable.12 8
12 See infra text accompanying notes 265-287.
123 The complete text of the British Computer Misuse Act of 1990 is reprinted at
the Appendix to this Comment.
'" 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988).
... 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
'2' 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
127 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988).
..8 H.R. Rep. No. 894, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 3689, 3691-92 [hereinafter Legislative History].
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1. Federal Wire Fraud Statute
At one time, the Federal Wire Fraud Statute was useful for
prosecuting hackers who used the wires to commit frauds.19 The
statute makes it a crime to perpetrate a fraud "for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses...
by means of wire, radio, or television communication in inter-
state or foreign commerce."' 30
The seminal case, United States v. Seidlitz'3' illustrates
how the wire fraud statute applies to hacking. In this case, Seid-
litz gained unauthorized access to the mainframe computer
owned by Optimum Systems, Inc. (OSI), a Maryland corporation
and Seidlitz's former employer. Seidlitz gained access by using
an access code to the OSI system, which he learned when he
worked at the firm.' 32
Upon accessing the system, Seidlitz copied' various parts
of a program known as "WYLBUR."'' 34 Over a four-month pe-
riod, Seidlitz accessed the system in OSI's Maryland office more
than forty times from his Virginia office. 35 The fact that Seidlitz
accessed the computer from across state lines enabled prosecu-
tors to use the wire fraud statute on the basis that the access
was gained through interstate commerce. 36
One problem that the prosecutors encountered in using the
wire fraud statute to prosecute Seidlitz was the statutory re-
quirement mandating that the scheme be fraudulent for pur-
poses of "obtaining money or property. 1 3 7 The court was faced
129 A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIME 38 (1978).
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
131 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1978).
13' This unauthorized access is hacking and differs from the access cited in the Ca-
nadian case, Regina v. McLaughlin, 2 S.C.R. 331 (1980). Here, the employee's access was
unauthorized by the employer, whereas Mr. McLaughlin's access was authorized. Mr.
McLaughlin abused the authorization by using the computer system for personal
reasons.
133 He copied by downloading the program. See supra note 84 for a definition of
downloading.
,3' BEQUAI, supra note 129, at 38. The WYLBUR program was used by the Corpora-
tion to obtain various government contracts. The program was one of the most sophisti-
cated of the time. Id.
135 Id.
" Legislative History, supra note 128, at 3692; See also BEQUAI, supra note 129, at
38.
13, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988). This section provides:
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with the question of whether a computer program was property.
In answering in the affirmative, the court noted that the pro-
gram was used to obtain government contracts, making it a
trade secret and therefore property.
38
Despite the above-mentioned victory, the federal wire fraud
statute is not without its downfalls. The statute is not effective
against hackers, such as the Australian hackers, who do not copy
programs in order to "obtain money or property."'1 9 If programs
are simply copied by hackers for personal use, the question be-
comes whether the program can be considered "property" under
the statute.
2. Federal Mail Fraud Act
A second statute used to prosecute computer offenses was
the Federal Mail Fraud Act.""° "This statute has two key ele-
ments that must be met: 1) use of the mails for the purpose of
executing, or attempting to execute, 2) a fraud or scheme to ob-
tain money or property under false pretenses."1' Although this
section applies to computer crimes, it would not apply to a ma-
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign com-
merce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both.
... United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 160 (4th Cir. 1978) cert. denied 441 U.S.
922 (1978).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
UO 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). This section provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter,
give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counter-
feit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented
to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any
post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever
to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any
such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the
direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the
person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
141 BEQUAI, supra note 129, at 37.
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jority of hackers because telephone lines, rather than the United
States Postal Service, are used to commit hacking offenses.
A computer case in which this statute was applied was
United States v. Kelly.142 Here, the court held that the mailing
of materials stored on the defendant's computer system, in order
to perpetrate a fraud, was enough to constitute mail fraud. 14 3
3. Federal Criminal Theft Statute
The Federal Criminal Theft Statute4 4 was the most effec-
tive of the three statutes when it came to prosecuting computer
crimes. 48 The statute makes it illegal to steal "any record ... or
thing of value.' 46 The court interpreted a "thing of value" in
United States v. Girard147 to include intangible as well as tangi-
ble items.1 48 The Girard case did not involve computers; rather
it involved Girard's plan to secure information concerning the
identity of government informants. 149
Although the Girard court liberally applied The Criminal
Theft Statute to favor the prosecution of computer crimes, the
legislative history of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, en-
acted to fortify the United States' position against computer
crime, indicates that such liberal construction was not the norm:
As these computer technologies and the means for abusing them
have rapidly emerged, they [courts] have been confronted by a
criminal justice system which is largely uninformed concerning
the technical aspects of computerization, and bound by tradi-
507 F. Supp. 495 (E.D.Pa. 1981).
143 Id.
144 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988). This statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the
use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record,
voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or
agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United
States or any department or agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his
use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted
1 Note, Who Is Calling Your Computer Next? Hacker! 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 89, 98
(1985) (authored by Diana Smith).
:46 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988).
, 601 F.2d 69 (2d. Cir. 1978) cert. denied 444 U.S. 871 (1979).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 70.
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tional legal machinery which in many cases may be ineffective
against unconventional criminal operations. Difficulties in coping
with computer abuse arise because much of the property involved
does not fit well into categories of property subject to abuse or
theft; a program, for example, may exist only in the form of mag-
netic impulses . . . . It is obvious that traditional theft/larceny
statutes are not the proper vehicle to control the spate of com-
puter abuse and computer assisted crimes.5 0
B. Present Prosecutions
1. Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The three federal statutes mentioned above are "ends"
based and only effective when hackers steal information or per-
petrate frauds. 5' This legislative gap prompted Congress to pass
a new statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.'52 The stat-
Legislative History, supra note 128, at 3695.
Id.
'5' 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988). This statute is an amended version of the original stat-
ute passed in 1984. The purpose of both statutes are identical. The 1986 statute was
strengthened by adding definitions to terms that may be ambiguous in Court. The stat-
ute also added a category for destruction of computer data. See generally Tompkins and
Mar, The 1984 Federal Computer Crime Statute: A Partial Answer to a Pervasive Prob-
lem 6 COMPUTER/L.J. 459 (1986).
The 1986 statute provides:
1030. Fraud and related activity in connection with computers
(a) Whoever-
(1) knowingly accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds author-
ized access, and by means of such conduct obtains information that has
been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Execu-
tive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure
for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data,
as defined in paragraph r. of section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
with the intent or reason to believe that such information so obtained is to
be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any for-
eign nation;
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds au-
thorized access, and thereby obtains information contained in a financial
record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer as defined in section
1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on
a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15
U.S.C. 1681 et. seq.);
(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any computer of a depart-
ment or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer of that de-
partment or agency that is exclusively for the use of the Government of the
United States or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, is
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/8
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ute's legislative history provides, in part:
used by or for the Government of the United States and such conduct af-
fects the use of the Government's operation of such computer;
(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a Federal interest com-
puter without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of
such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value,
unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the
use of the computer;
(5) intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without authorization
and by means of one or more instances of such conduct alters, damages, or
destroys information in any such Federal interest computer, or prevents au-
thorized use of any such computer or information, and thereby-
(A) causes loss to one or more others of a value
aggregating $1,000 or more during any one year
period; or
(B) modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies
or impairs, the medical examination, medical di-
agnosis, medical treatment, or medical care of
one or more individuals; or
(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as defined in section
1029) in any password or similar information through which a computer
may be accessed without authorization, if-
(A) such trafficking affects interstate or foreign
commerce; or
(B) such computer is used by or for the Govern-
ment of the United States;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
(b) Whoever attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this section
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
(c) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) of this section is-
(1)(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years,
or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section
which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under such sub-
section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subpara-
graph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than twenty years,
or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section
which occurs after a conviction for another offense under such subsection,
or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;
and
(2)(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3) or (a)(6) of
this section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense
under such subsection, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable
under this subparagraph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or
both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3) or (a)(6) of
this section which occurs after a conviction for another offense under such
subsection, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this sub-
paragraph; and
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There is no specific Federal legislation in the area of computer
(3)(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than five years,
or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(4) or (a)(5) of this
section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under
such subsection, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this
subparagraph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or
both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(4) or (a)(5) of this sec-
tion which occurs after a conviction for another offense under such subsec-
tion, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this
subparagraph.
(d) The United States Secret Service shall, in addition to any other agency having
such authority, have the authority to investigate offenses under this section. Such
authority of the United States Secret Service shall be exercised in accordance with
an agreement which shall be entered into by the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Attorney General.
(e) As used in this section-
(1) the term "computer" means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electro-
chemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical,
arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or
communication facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with
such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or
typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device;
(2) the term "Federal interest computer" means a computer-
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the
United States Government, or, in the case of a computer not
exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial institution
or the United States Government and the conduct constitut-
ing the offense affects the use of the financial institution's op-
eration or the Government's operation of such computer; or
(B) which is one of two or more computers used in committing
the offense, not all of which are located in the same State;
(3) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and any other possession or territory of the United States;
(4) the term "financial institution" means-
(A) a bank with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation;
(B) the Federal Reserve or a member of the Federal Reserve
including any Federal Reserve Bank;
(C) an institution with accounts insured by the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation;
(D) a credit union with accounts insured by the National
Credit Union Administration;
(E) a member of the Federal home loan bank system and any
home loan bank;
(F) any institution of the Farm Credit System under the Farm
Credit Act of 1971;
(G) a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission pursuant to section 15 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
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crime. Any enforcement action in response to computer-related
crime must rely on statutory restrictions that were designed for
other offenses, such as mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) or wire fraud
(18 U.S.C. § 1343) statutes. Even if an approach is devised that
apparently covers the alleged acts in computer-related crimes, it
still must be treated as an untested basis for prosecution in the
Federal trial courts.
53
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act filled the legislative
void of the "ends" statutes, by criminalizing the "means" of
hacking, and made unauthorized access in and of itself illegal.
The Act is limited in scope to computers of a "Federal inter-
est." 5 4 Section 1030(e)(2) defines a Federal Interest computer as
one used by the government, a financial institution of the gov-
ernment, or a computer that is one of two or more computers
located in different states and used to commit an offense.'"5
Therefore, jurisdiction is created only over the computers in the
above categories.
The statute also prohibits unauthorized access to informa-
tion that is adverse to National Security, 5" or to information
(H) the Securities Investor Protection Corporation;
(5) the term "financial record" means information derived from any record
held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer's relationship with
the financial institution;
(6) the term "exceeds authorized access" means to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter; and
(7) the term "department of the United States" means the legislative or
judicial branch of the Government or one of the executive departments
enumerated in section 101 of title 5.
(f) This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective,
or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, a State,
or a political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the United
States.
,13 Legislative History, supra note 128, at 3691.
'" Section 1030(e)(2) defines a Federal Interest computer as one;
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution of the United States Govern-
ment, or in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a
financial institution or the United States Government and the conduct constitut-
ing the offense affects the use of the financial institution's operation or the Gov-
ernment's operation of such computer; or
(B) which is one of two or more computers used in committing the offense, not all
of which are located in the same state. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(e)(2)(A) & (B) (1988).
,' 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)(B) (1988).
Id. at § 1030(a)(1).
31
PACE YB. INT'L L.
contained in a financial record or consumer reporting agency. 157
Therefore, the statute pertains to hacking for fun, and it is of no
legal consequence if a hacker's activities do not result in finan-
cial gain. 5 ' In addition, the statute also protects against de-
struction of or prevention of access to information in a Federal
interest computer, 159 provided the damage to the victims is more
than $1,000 during a one-year period. a°
2. The Morris Case
The first successful prosecution under the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act was United States v. Morris.' The case in-
volved a Cornell University graduate student studying computer
science who unleashed a paralyzing computer worm program
1 6 2
on November 2, 1988, causing a virus to invade more than five
thousand computers across the United States. 163 The case is par-
amount because it is only the second case tried under the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act'" and the first successful
conviction.6 5
387 Id. at § 1030(a)(2).
Although the statute does also have a provision forbidding stealing by computer.
Id. at § 1030(a)(4).
5' Id. at § 1030(a)(5).
360 Id.
,6, No. 90-1336 (D.C.N.Y. 1990) aff'd 928 F.2d 504, (2d Cir. 1991). See also Kane,
Sorcerer's Apprentice Meets Less Benign Fate, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 5, 1990, at 8, col. 1.
'62 Basically, a worm program is a computer instruction or small hidden program
inserted on a standard computer program or into a computers operating system. Note,
supra note 145, at 627. These instructions may reproduce many times during a single
program execution, infect every program on a computer disk and be passed on secretly to
other computers through modems, floppy disks, or network connections. Id. See also
LEGISLATIVE BUDGET AND FINANCE COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE PA GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
1988, 8 (1988).
The reason why Mr. Morris' worm program was so devastating was because it was
written in binary code, which is the language of electronic impulses that computers use
to communicate. This code is very difficult for programmers to break down. Kane, supra
note 161.
"' Kane, supra note 161. The virus attacked the network of Internet, the same net-
work the most recent Australian hackers penetrated. Id.; See also Global Peril, supra
note 2, at A16.
64 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988). See Kane, supra note 161 for the other case, United
States v. Doe, 88-CR-672 (1988).
Kane, supra note 161, at 8. Mr. Morris was convicted on January 22, 1990. Id.
He was sentenced to three years probation and 400 hours of community service on May
4, 1990. United States District Judge Howard Munson also ordered him to pay a $10,000
[Vol. 3:199
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As with the Australian hackers, Morris said he unleashed
the program to magnify the security problems existing in the in-
fected computer systems, and his intention was not to disable
the systems. 6
The Morris case illustrates the typical hacking offense and
the resultant damage. The disabled computer systems that were
shut down throughout the United States"67 meant that a signifi-
cant number of businesses, universities, and even NASA could
not operate. The result was millions of dollars in losses.168
Like the Australian hackers, Morris stole' 69 the passwords
of authorized users to the systems, thus blocking legitimate ac-
cess. 17 0 In addition, the damage caused by Morris's worm pro-
gram required corrections at the expense of hundreds of over-
time hours.1 7 ' Because of the extensive damage, Morris was
charged and convicted under section 1030(a)(5)(A) of the Act17 2
fine plus court and probation costs. This was a lenient sentence under the Act consider-
ing the maximum sentence is five years and $250,000 in fines. Schaefer, Computer
Hacker Gets Probation, Fine, United Press International, May 5, 1990 (NEXIS, U.P.I.
library).
,' Kane, supra note 161, at 8. Hackers are very often breaking into computer sys-
tems to show a company that security problems exist. Usually, the hacker will acknowl-
edge this fact by posting a message once inside the system proving that he got inside.
Note, supra note 145, at 94.
Some have said a hacker is a blessing in disguise because they argue he performs a
valuable public function in exposing security flaws in computer systems. Id. However, it
is generally recognized that hackers should give notice to companies before attempting to
perform this "public service." Mr Morris did not attempt to give notice until after he
found out his program had gone awry. Kane, supra note 181.
,' Kane, supra note 161.
'e' Id.
'6' See supra note 35 and accompanying text for discussion of stealing passwords.
Kane, supra note 161, at 8; See also Schulkins, The Electronic Burglar, 1 CoM-
PUTER L. & PRAC. 140 (1985).
"', Kane, supra note 161, at 8. A worm is a form of a virus. A virus requires many
hours of work for computer operators to rid the system of it. This type of damage can
also occur when hackers browse. For example, in one case, hackers gained access to the
records of an intensive care ward in a Los Angeles hospital and altered the patients
records by doubling all patients doses of medication. Although no damage was done, it
took dozens of medical and computer personnel to review the 6,000 patient files in the
hospital to be sure no tampering had occurred. Mann, supra note 113, at 158-59. Preven-
tion of this type of alteration of medical records is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)
(1988). See supra note 152 for the text of this prohibition.
"' 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) provides:
(a) whoever-
(5) intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without authoriza-
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for "gaining unauthorized access to computers, preventing their
use and causing losses in excess of $1,000."'1
A potential weakness in the statute that was highlighted by
the Morris case was the element of "intent." The section of the
statute under which Morris was charged renders it unlawful to
"intentionally access a Federal interest computer without au-
thorization and by means of one or more instances of such con-
duct alters, damages, or destroys information . 174
In this case, the sophistication of Morris's program indi-
cated that he clearly did not intend to cause the damage. 15 His
actual intent was to expose security flaws in the systems en-
tered. ' If the program had not gone awry, the damage would
not have occurred.1 77
The Court interpreted the definition of intent to include the
"means" of Morris' actions. District Judge Howard G. Munson
instructed the jury that "[t]he government need not prove that
it was the defendant's intention to prevent access to computers
or to cause damage to those computers. 1 78 Notably, Morris'
conviction was possible because the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act is a "means" statute and consequently the only matter of
legal concern was that Morris utilized his computer to cause the
damage.
Morris' conviction has been upheld on appeal. Therefore,
Judge Munson's instructions pertaining to "intent" were law-
ful.1 79 Morris demonstrates that the United States is now serious
about preventing domestic computer crime by attacking its
"means." The fact that Morris' crime was generated via a com-
puter is the hinging factor dictating a United States emphasis on
C4means" as opposed to "ends."
tion, and by means of one or more instances of such conduct alters, dam-
ages, or destroys information in any such Federal interest computer, or pre-
vents authorized use of any such computer or information, and thereby-
(A) causes loss to one or more others of a value aggregating
$1,000 or more during any one year period ....
' ' Kane, supra note 161, at 8.
'7, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (1988).
175 Kane, supra note 161, at 8.
170 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
17 United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, (2d Cir. 1991).
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3. Criticisms of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Morris' conviction under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act does not guarantee that all incidents of hacking will be pros-
ecuted. Scholars have criticized the statute as not comprehen-
sive enough.180 First, it has been suggested that the monetary
amounts be repealed because a hacker may not cause $1,000 of
damage if mere browsingl al occurs. Second, if a hacker accessed
a non-Federal interest computer, then jurisdiction does not at-
tach.182 Consequently, a loophole is left open for hackers who
browse non-Federal interest computers within state boundaries.
Under this scenario, a hacker's activities would go unprosecuted
unless prohibited by state law. 85
Third, the act fails to define key terms, including: "access,"
"authorization," "use," and "affects."1 84 This failure potentially
creates ambiguities for District Courts to wrestle with. 86
Fourth, the definition that does exist creates a de minimis
exception under the Act.' The instrumentality addressed by
the act is a "computer." '187 The Act specifically excludes type-
writers, calculators, and "other similar devices' l8 8 that are usu-
ally not excluded from definitions of computers.8 " The defini-
tion is weak because in the future, "other similar devices" may
be used to commit hacking offenses and remain beyond prosecu-
180 See Tompkins & Mar, The 1984 Federal Computer Crime Statute: A Partial
Answer to a Persuasive Problem, 6 COMPUTER/ L.J. 459 (1986).
'8' Id. at 472. Browsing has been called "computer trespass", or browsing at files or
data.
For example, if a person breaks into the Pentagon computers and just views the
top secret information, it is not a crime. In order to violate the Act in this case,
the person would have to obtain the information with the intent or reason to be-
lieve that the information will be used to harm the United States.
Note, Computer Crime and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 10 COMPUTER/
L.J. 71, 79-80 (1990) (authored by Christopher D. Chen) [hereinafter Chen].
"'- See supra text accompanying notes 154-55. This is interesting because non-Fed-
eral interest computers are corporate computers which are arguably subject to the most
abuse, yet are virtually ignored under the Act. Chen, supra note 181, at 79-80.
183 Soma, Smith & Sprague, Legal Analysis of Electronic Bulletin Board Activities,
7 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 571, 603 (1985) [hereinafter Soma].
184 Tompkins & Mar, supra note 180, at 476.
185 Id.
188 Id. at 463.
87 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (1988).
188 Id. at § 1030(e)(1).
... Tompkins and Mar, supra note 180, at 463.
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tion. Also, difficulty in interpreting the term may come about.
However, the federal statute improves upon the approach to
hacking prior to its enactment. Overall, the United States may
not be far behind Canada in the prosecution of hacking offenses
on the domestic level because many states have anti-hacking
laws.'90 However, hackers who know the laws can avoid prosecu-
tion by taking advantage of jurisdictions that do not criminalize
their acts.
In short, the United States federal and state systems have
narrowed the hacking that can occur without violation of a stat-
ute.191 Questions remain as to whether a hacker who does not
cause damage can be convicted and whether the statute will
have a deterrent effect. The recent Australian incident is not a
positive sign that these statutes actually deter.
In addition, the United States statute, like the Canadian
provisions, does nothing to prevent hacking on an international
level because provisions for territoriality, extradition or double
criminality are not included.
VI. THE UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom's legal system prosecutes hacking dif-
ferently as compared with the United States and Canada in that
its domestic system is not as strong in attacking the "ends" of
hacking. England has not modified its property laws to attack
hacking. However, the Computer Misuse Act'92 was recently en-
acted to punish the "means" of hacking. This statute approaches
hacking on an international scale. In addition to this assured
global protection, England also has a unique statute, The Data
Protection Act, 9 3 which theoretically can be applied to interna-
tional hacking. To date, however, The Data Protection Act has
100 Soma, supra note 183, at 621.
In addition, Congress introduced legislation to criminalize computer viruses, en-
titled "The Computer Virus Eradication Act of 1989." This legislation will be an amend-
ment to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and would aim to further punish activity
such as that undertaken by Robert Morris that spreads viruses through computers. See
generally Note, The Computer Virus Eradication Act of 1989: The War Against Com-
puter Crime Continues, 3 SOFTWARE L.J. 717-53 (1990).
102 Computer Misuse Act, 1990, ch. 18 (Lexis, International library, U.K. file). See
Appendix.
203 See infra text accompanying notes 225-234.
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not been used for that purpose.
A. Attempted Prosecutions
The case of Regina v. Gold and Schifreen' 4 illustrates the
inadequacy of the English property laws in combatting hacking.
The case was decided by the High Court and was unsuccessful in
prosecuting hackers under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act of
1981.195 The case is one of global magnitude in illustrating the
problem of "ends" oriented prosecution of the hacker who
causes no damage.
The case arose when Gold and Schifreen, two juvenile hack-
ers, broke into the Prestel system19 in England by figuring out
passwords and user codes of authorized users.197 The prosecution
contemplated conviction of the defendants upon deception
grounds,"9 ' but, under English law, deception must occur against
a human being.19 9 Here, the only deception that occurred was
against a computer. The defendants tricked the computer into
believing that they were the Duke of Edinburgh and thus were
able to leave a message in the Duke's electronic mailbox.200
The prosecution attempted conviction under the Forgery
and Counterfeiting Act of 1981,201 instead of upon deception
grounds. The Forgery and Counterfeiting Act prohibits the crea-
tion or use of a forged instrument with the intention of causing
194 [1987] 3 W.L.R. 803. See also Lloyd, Computer Abuse and The Law 104 THE
L.Q. REv. 202 (1988); Nicholls, Hacking and the Criminal Law 3 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 64
(1986); Kwiatkowski, Hacking and the Criminal Law Revisited, 4 COMPUTER L & PRAC.
15 (1987); Kwiatkowski, British Telecom Hackers Vindicated, 4 COMPUTER L. & PRAC.
172 (1988) [hereinafter British Telecom].
196 Forgery and Counterfeiting Act, 1981, ch. 45.
19 Lloyd, supra note 194, at 202. This system is owned by British Telecom and
offers a variety of data bases to customers. The customer is supplied with a password
and user code to gain access. This system is much like CompuServe in the United States.
Id.
197 The defendants tried unsuccessfully to convince British Telecom that the Prestel
System was not secure. Therefore, in order to prove their point, they broke into the
Prestel electronic mailbox of the Duke of Edinburgh. British Telecom, supra note 194, at
173. The purpose of illustrating an unsecured system was also the motivating factor be-
hind the Australian hacker's and Mr. Morris' actions of hacking.
198 Lloyd, supra note 194, at 203.
199 Id. (citing Davies v. Flackett, [1973] R.T.R. 8).
0 Lloyd, supra note 194, at 203.
0o' Forgery and Counterfeiting Act, 1981, ch. 45.
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another "to do or not to do some act to his own or any other
person's prejudice. 20 2
An "instrument," under the Act, is defined, inter alia, as
"any disc, tape, soundtrack or other device on or in which infor-
mation is recorded or stored by mechanical, electronic or other
means."2 ° An instrument is false "if it purports to have been
made in the form ... by a person who did not in fact make it in
that form, 204 or "if it purports to have been made in the form
... on the authority of a person who did not in fact authorise its
making in that form ....
To secure a conviction, the prosecution had to identify the
false instrument that the defendants allegedly created.0 6 Conse-
quently, an attempt was made to identify the password as the
instrument.20 7 The court held, however, that the electronic im-
pulses a computer produces are not devices "on or in which in-
formation is . . . stored," and thus passwords are not instru-
ments.2 8 As a result of this determination, the court overturned
the trial court's conviction of the defendants.20 9
The case illustrates the problems faced by countries without
modified "ends" laws deeming information to be property. The
case further illustrates the need for "means" statutes. Because
in this instance no damage occurred, the leaving of the unautho-
rized message in the Duke's electronic mailbox could not be
prosecuted under the United Kingdom's "ends" statute.
B. The Computer Misuse Act of 1990
Realizing the need for domestic legislation to attack hacking
and to prevent England from becoming an "international hack-
ers' haven, 21 0 Michael Colvin (C, Romsey and Waterside) intro-
duced in Parliament legislation aimed at preventing the com-
.2 Id. at pt. I, § 3.
203 Id. at pt. I, § 8(1)(d).
204 Id. at pt. I, § 9(1)(a).
201 Id. at pt. I, § 9(1)(b).
20. British Telecom, supra note 194, at 173.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
10 Bill to Curb Hacking Sent to Lords, The Daily Telegraph, May 5, 1990, at 11
(NEXIS, CURRNT library).
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puter crime. On June 29, 1990, Parliament passed Colvin's
legislation, The Computer Misuse Act of 1990.211 The stated
purpose of the Act is "to make provision for securing computer
material against unauthorised access or modification ... "21
The Act creates three offenses: causing a computer to per-
form any function with intent to gain access to any program or
data held in any computer;213 committing the above offense with
intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a further of-
fense;21 4 and causing an unauthorized modification of the con-
tents of any computer.2 5
On a domestic level, the Computer Misuse Act criminalizes
the "means" of hacking by prohibiting mere access to a com-
puter system. A hacker causes a computer to perform a function
with intent to gain access when he enters passwords during the
process of accessing a system.2 6
The Computer Misuse Act expands the "ends" approach by
criminalizing the use of computers for illegal conduct, including
217 Atcigte"ns iacts beyond unauthorized access. Attacking the "ends" via
this statute however, is not as effective as modifying property
statutes, as Canada has done. For example, if-a hacker robs a
bank by using his computer to transfer funds, he will only be
subject to prosecution under The Computer Misuse Act.
As such, the hacker is subject to a five-year prison sentence
under the Act218 and will avoid potentially stiff penalties under
"ends" bank robbery statutes. In short, no matter what "end"
damage results, a hacker is subject only to a five-year sentence
under the Computer Misuse Act.
Finally, the Computer Misuse Act penalizes hackers who
The Computer Misuse Act, 1990, ch. 18 (Lexis, International library, U.K. file).
See Appendix for the full text. The Act came into force on August 29, 1990.
212 Id. at Long Title.
213 Id. at § 1.
Id. at § 2.
2" Id. at § 3. Modification of the contents of a computer if data held in the com-
puter is altered or erased or any program or data is added to its contents. Id. at §§
17(7)(a) & (b). This modification is unauthorized if the person's actions causing the mod-
ification is not entitled to determine whether the modification should be made, or if that
person does not have consent to modify. Id. at §§ 17(8)(a) & (b).
"' Wasik, Tackling Technocrime: The Law Commission Report on Computer Mis-
use, 6 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 23, 24 (1989) [hereinafter Tackling Technocrime].
217 Computer Misuse Act, 1990, ch. 18, § 2.
Id. at § 2(5)(b).
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unleash viruses into a computer system, by making it illegal to
tamper with the contents of a computer. 19 Therefore, the Mor-
ris incident,220 for example, is illegal under the Act.
Due to the fact that the Computer Misuse Act has been en-
acted recently, no cases yet have tested its applicability under
English law. However, once the Act is tested there is every indi-
cation that it will prove to be highly effective in attacking hack-
ing on an international scale.
First, the Act contains provisions dealing with jurisdiction
and the territorial problems associated with hacking.221 Second,
the Act states that British citizenship is immaterial in its appli-
cation to hacking offenses.222 Finally, the Act includes provisions
for extradition 223 and double criminality.22 Therefore, the Com-
puter Misuse Act contains strong, albeit untested, provisions
concerning the international aspects of both the "ends" and
"means" of hacking.
C. The Data Protection Act
In addition to the Computer Misuse Act, the United King-
dom's Data Protection Act of 198425 may be applicable to hack-
ing offenses, although no situation has presented itself to this
date. 226 The main purpose of the Data Protection Act is to pro-
tect individuals' right to know if personal information pertaining
to them is being stored in an "agency's" computer.227 Individuals
219 Id. at § 3.
220 See supra notes 161-179 and accompanying text.
222 Computer Misuse Act, 1990, ch. 18, § 4.
222 Id. at § 9.
223 Id. at § 15.
224 Id. at § 8(1).
22' Data Protection Act, 1984, ch. 35. See also Howe, Data Protection in the United
Kingdom, 3 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 204 (1987); Chalton, Data Protection: New Civil Lib-
erty, or Heffalump Trap?, 1 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 31 (1984); Burkert, Institutions of
Data Protection-An Attempt at a Functional Explanation of European National Data
Protection Laws, 3 COMPUTER/L.J. 167 (1981); Raymont, Information Technologies: A
Challenge to the Individual and to the Enterprise, 1 COMPUTER L. & PRAc. 22 (1984).
226 OECD, supra note 38, at 21. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development states the Act "could be applicable because its principle that personal data
must be adequately secured may lead to increased emphasis on computer security all
around." Id.
227 Data Protection Act, 1984, ch. 35, pt. III, § 21. See also Howe, supra note 225, at
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who know of such information being stored further have the
right to ensure that the information is accurate.22
The Data Protection Act theoretically can be applied to
hacking because it provides for civil and criminal penalties for
the wrongful disclosure of information about an individual.2 29
The Act calls for adequate security measures, without specifying
what is deemed adequate, in order to protect from wrongful dis-
closure of personal information stored on computer systems.2 30
Therefore, it is theoretically possible under the Data Protection
Act to penalize 31 a holder of personal information, rather than a
hacker, if a hacker should acquire unauthorized access to per-
sonal information collected about an individual.
The Data Protection Act however, has numerous exemp-
tions to the requirement that computer systems storing personal
information must be secure. Thus, all computer systems are not
under the jurisdiction of the Act.232
The Act has not yet been applied to hacking incidents. One
possible explanation for this is that the Act punishes the victims
of the crime rather than the perpetrator. Furthermore, fewer
hacking incidents may be reported than actually occur because
the one who reports the hacking is subject to penalties under the
Act.
Despite the above, the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development in its study of computer crime asserted
that the Act could lead to increased emphasis upon computer
The Act requires any agency that holds information on individuals to register with a
Registrar of Data. Data Protection Act, 1984, ch. 35, pt. II, § 4(1).
228 Howe, supra note 225, at 204. This part of the Act is aimed at ensuring that
credit information, for one, is accurate. Id. at 205-06.
'"' Data Protection Act, 1984, ch. 35, pt. II, § 15(1). This section provides that
"[p]ersonal data in respect of which services are provided shall not be disclosed . . .
without the prior authority of the person for whom those services are provided." Id. See
also Id. at sched. I, which sets up the principles underlying the Data Protection Act.
230 Id. at sched. I, pt. 1, § 8 which provides: "8. Appropriate security measures shall
be taken against unauthorised access to, or alteration, disclosure or destruction of, per-
sonal data and against accidental loss or destruction of personal data."
2 Penalties under the Act include both civil remedies and criminal penalties. One
provision of the Act allows an individual to be compensated as a result of unauthorized
information that is disclosed. Id. at pt. III, § 23(1). Another provision holds the director,
manager, secretary or similar officer of a corporation criminally liable under the Act. Id.
at pt. II, § 20(1).
232 See id. at pts. III & IV.
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security. 23 The Organisation's theory leads to another explana-
tion as to why few cases exist; that is, computer systems are se-
cured as required by the Data Protection Act. This eliminates
the need and increases the difficulty for hackers to expose secur-
ity flaws.
In summary, England must modify its current "ends" prop-
erty statutes, as evidenced by the Regina v Gold and Schifreen
case, in order to have a domestic system comparable to Canada's
in attacking computer crime.23 4 However, there is hope in that
the Computer Misuse Act of 1990 is a strong "means" statute.
When coupled with the Data Protection Act, the combination
may be adequate to combat hacking domestically without the
need for modifying "ends" statutes. Furthermore, the Computer
Misuse Act is exemplary in approaching hacking on an interna-
tional level.
VII. SOLUTIONS
A. Security
The Australian arrests illustrate security problems that ex-
ist with computer systems.2 3 The security problems, in addition
to the English Data Protection Act, raise the question of
whether an adequate solution to hacking is the enactment of
laws compelling owners of computer systems to secure the sys-
tems and holding them liable for break-ins into non-secured sys-
tems. Going hand-in-hand with such statutes compelling secur-
ity would have to be statutes requiring mandatory reporting of
computer crimes to appropriate authorities.2 36
The disadvantage of such a system is that the victims of the
crime would not only be violated by hackers, but would also bear
penalties should they choose not to report their victimization.
This raises equitable arguments as to such a system's validity in
that it deprives computer owners of freedom of choice.
First, a corporation may be willing to bear the risk of a
hacker breaking into its system because the amount of economic
" OECD, supra note 38, at 21.
" See supra text accompanying notes 194-209.
"6 See Global Peril, supra note 2.
230 See Scottish Law Commission: Report on Computer Crime, 3 COMPUTER L. &
PRAC. 27, 28 (1987).
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damage done will be minimal in comparison to the cost of either:
establishing a security system; or the damage to its corporate
reputation if publicity should result from the hacking.23 Second,
no security system can be absolutely safe. There is always a
chance that someone will hack the system. 238 Therefore, security
alone, without legislative action, will not be sufficient to conquer
the problem.
In contrast, there are advantages to compelling computer
users to secure their systems. Such is a reasonable measure be-
cause it will force awareness of security lapses, and thus further
the ultimate desire of deterrence of hacking.239 Deterrence of
hacking would occur if users are compelled to secure computers,
because the difficulty of hacking would increase. Thus, the
hacker's self-imposed mission of exposing security flaws would
be eliminated.2 0
Different security measures have been suggested by the
United States Government. 2 1 One recommendation it that com-
puter owners identify an individual who is responsible for infor-
mation security.2 4 Other methods are: to secure,243 manage "
23 These corporations gamble that the risk of loss is less than the cost of the bene-
fits derived from a secure system. An example of this would be a personal computer
owner who has a modem hooked up to his computer, but feels security is not really
necessary. See Schulkins, Who Needs Security?, 1 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 65, 66 (1984); J.
CARROLL, COMPUTER SECURITY 10-12 (1977).
Also, as seen from the legislative history of the United States Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, the corporation may be concerned that the publicity will lead to more hack-
ers trying to enter the system because they know it is an easy target. Legislative History,
supra note 128, at 3697.
238 Schulkins, supra note 237, at 65.
239 Price-Waterhouse conducted a survey in 1985 which indicated that system secur-
ity was lacking in U.S. corporations. The Survey examined 131 Companies and indicated
.that twenty-five percent (25%) provided adequate security systems while the remaining
seventy-five percent (75%) failed to employ security at all. Note, Who is Calling Your
Computer Next? Hacker!, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 89, 110 (1985) (authored by Diana Smith).
240 See generally A. BEQUAI, How TO PREVENT COMPUTER CRIME (1983); U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPUTER SECURITY TECHNIQUES (1982);
PREVENTION COMMITrEE, PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, COMPUTERS:
CRIMES, CLUES, AND CONTROLS (1986) [hereinafter PREVENTION COMMITEE); D. PARKER,
CRIME BY COMPUTER (1976); J. CARROLL, COMPUTER SECURITY (1977); U.S. CONGRESS, OF-
FICE OF TECHNOLOGY AND ASSESSMENT, DEFENDING SECRETS, SHARING DATA: NEW LOCKS
AND KEYS FOR ELECTRONIC INFORMATION (1987) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT].
241 PREVENTION COMMITTEE, supra note 240, at 9-19.
242 Id. at 37.
2" Id. at 15. This includes employees not sharing passwords, choosing passwords
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and create multi-level passwords;245 to keep remote systems off
when not in use;2 46 to restrict the files and information that can
be accessed by certain people;247 to keep logs for the system;248
to limit the number of incorrect passwords acceptable to a sys-
tem before disconnection;249 and to investigate frequent system
crashes. 2 50
Other systems for security are "call-back" systems; 251 en-
cryption or scrambling program systems;2 52 "read only" sys-
tems;2 53 and "token-based" systems.2 54 This is by no means a
hard to guess, letting the computer generate passwords, and mixing letters and numbers
in creation of passwords. Id.
244 Id. at 16. This includes changing passwords periodically and on an irregular
schedule, assigning password access to trusted officials only, invalidating passwords when
officials leave the company, and protecting the files that have password access. Id.
245 This is basically requiring more than one password to be entered before access is
obtained. See supra note 35 and accompanying text for the definition of a password.
240 PREVENTION COMMITTEE, supra note 240, at 17.
Id. at 16.
248 Id. at 13. Logs are "[a] record of operations of a computer system listing each job
or run, the time it required, operator actions, and other pertinent data." COMPUTER Dic-
TIONARY, supra note 1, at 214. These logs were the files the Australian hackers erased to
conceal their identities. Global Peril, supra note 2.
This is also done by Audit Trails which "maintain an ongoing record of who is using
the system and what major actions are performed. The system's operators can then re-
view this 'audit trail' to determine unusual patterns of activity (e.g., someone consist-
ently using the system after office hours) or to reconstruct the events leading to a major
error or system failure." TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 240, at 86.
141 PREVENTION COMMITTEE, supra note 240, at 17. Basically this is limiting the num-
ber of attempts to enter a password and access the system to, for example, two or three
attempts, or the phone connection will automatically terminate. Id.
250 Id. at 14. A system crash is "(1) The cessation of the operation of a computer. (2)
A system shutdown caused by a hardware malfunction or a software mistake." COMPUTER
DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 79. This is a symptom of a computer virus.
25 This is a system where the computer terminates the connection once access is
achieved by a remote user. After termination, the computer will dial the pre-program-
med phone number of the authorized user. Schulkins, The Electronic Burglar, 1 CoM-
PUTER L. & PRAC. 140, 141 (1985).
552 These programs prevent hackers from breaking into a valid connection between
an authorized user and remote computer. The information is scrambled and appears as
"garbage" on the hackers' computer terminal. Id. at 140.
253 This system prevents data alteration by remote access. The system enables a
hacker to browse the data, but not alter it. The only individual authorized to change the
data is the one with the passwords to the writing files. Note, supra note 239, at 110.
254 This system has a device that is hooked up to the remote user's system which
generates a digital "token." The "token" is similar to a password but randomly gener-
ated by the "token" device and is unknown to the remote user. This system allows the
host computer to determine if the computer attempting access is authorized. TECHNOL-
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complete list of security systems, and many new systems are be-
ing developed for better security in the future.2 55
In summary, a law compelling security would not be inequi-
table because the burden of complying with such a statute would
be minimal due to existing technology for computer security.
One possible solution is to deem personal information holders
liable for security lapses as does the English Data Protection
Act. However, a necessary addition to such a requirement is the
enactment of a second statute requiring mandatory reporting of
hacking. Without such a combination of legislation, the United
Kingdom's approach will accomplish concealment, rather than
conquering of hacking. If all computer users employed security
systems, hacking to expose security flaws would be unnecessary
and thus international hacking would be less of a problem.2 56 In
addition, hacking without detection would be more difficult.
2 5 7
B. International
As illustrated by the recent Australian arrests, security is
not instituted worldwide. Therefore, hacking occurs on a global
scale. An examination of hacking prevention measures that have
been and can be employed globally is therefore in order.
1. Convention for the Protection of Individuals
Although there has been no conventions directly addressing
hacking, one applicable convention is the 1981 Convention for
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Process-
ing of Personal Data.258
OGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 240, at 74-77.
... One such system being developed is the Biometric and Behavioral Identification
System. This system identifies a user by a biological aspect, such as the retina pattern of
the user's eye. Id. at 77-83.
"' The Australian case illustrates this type of hacking. Global Peril, supra note 2.
... Again as the Australian incident illustrates, the hackers were not detected for
two years because they had written a program that erased the security files that were
used to keep track of who had logged onto the system. Many of the security files, how-
ever, were easy to enter. If more advanced security and tracking systems were used, such
as the types listed above, the hackers would have had a much more difficult time in both
entering the security files and escaping detection.
... Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Process-
ing of Personal Data at Strasbourg, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter
Convention].
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As with the United Kingdom's Data Protection Act,2 59 the
Convention's main concern is the protection of "personal
data."260 Article 1 of the Convention states its object and pur-
pose in a nutshell: "The purpose of this Convention is to secure
in the territory of each Party for every individual, whatever his
nationality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental
freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to
automatic processing of personal data relating to him ('data
protection'). "261
Article 7 is concerned with data security.262 Basically, the
Article requires holders of personal data to use appropriate se-
curity measures to protect data against unauthorized destruction
or access.
263
As with the English Data Protection Act, this Convention,
Article 7 in particular, places the burden of preventative mea-
sures on the holder of information. Therefore, the risk assess-
ment option available to a computer owner is eliminated.
The problem with this Convention in application to hacking
is that not all computer systems hold "personal data," and thus
security for all systems is not required. The lack of universal
security for all computer systems will not alleviate the problem
but will simply reduce the available number of systems that can
be penetrated.
On a final note, the best of security systems is inadequate
without one additional crucial ingredient-world cooperation. As
illustrated by the Australian hacking incident, the world must
cooperate to criminalize hacking and send a message that hack-
As of March 1988, countries who signed the convention were:
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, F.R. Germany, Greece, Icelgnd, Ireland, It-
aly, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and The United Kingdom. Data Protection Update 4 COMPUTER L.
& PRAC. 136 (1988).
... See supra text accompanying notes 225-34.
26' "Personal data" is defined in Article two of the convention as "any information
relating to an identified or identifiable individual ('data subject') . Convention,
supra note 258, at art. 2(a).
"" Id. at art. 1.
... Id. at art. 7. Article 7 provides: "Appropriate security measures shall be taken for
the protection of personal data stored in automated data files against accidental or
unauthorised destruction or accidental loss as well as against unauthorised access, altera-
tion or dissemination." Id.
262 Id
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ers will be prosecuted for their misconduct."6 4
2. OECD Suggestions
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) 265 has conducted an analysis of legal policy con-
cerning computer crime. 266 This analysis includes suggestions on
how to eliminate international hacking.
The study's introduction explains a prime reason behind its
initiation is "[t]o try to reach a common understanding both of
computer-related crime itself and of how the law can deal with
it."2 6 7 The remainder of this section will summarize the solutions
to hacking as suggested by OECD.
a. Legislative - Domestic
New legislation must be passed worldwide 268 because even if
hacking does not occur within a single nation, hacking is an in-
ternational dilemma of which every nation is a potential vic-
tim. 269 The legislation should punish both the "means" as well
as the "ends" of hacking.
As far as legislation that punishes the "means," OECD sug-
gests, first, a specific statutory provision criminalizing mere ac-
24 One of the Australian hackers falsely believed he was not chargeable with a fel-
ony for his hacking. International cooperation like that of a convention would aid in
educating hackers that the world is serious about preventing their crime. Global Peril,
supra note 2.
265 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 10 COMPUTER RE-
LATED CRIME: ANALYSIS OF LEGAL POLICY (1986) [hereinafter OECD).
2" Id.
267 Id. at 7.
8OECD, supra note 265, at 38-39.
1 This again is illustrated by the Australian incident. The computer systems pene-
trated were in the United States. Because Australian legislation gives Australia jurisdic-
tion over hacking from Australia into other countries, the hackers could properly be ar-
rested under the scope of that legislation. Global Peril, supra note 2. If Australia did not
have specific legislation aimed at the "means" of hacking, the United States would not
have been able to reach the hackers outside of attempting extradition procedures for
violation of "ends" statutes.
The most recent Dutch situation illustrates this very dilemma. The Netherlands
does not have a specific "means" statute, so the United States is forced to rely on extra-
dition procedures based on violation of "ends" statutes by the hackers. See Dutch
Rogues, supra note 8.
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cess 2 7  The rationale behind such provisions is that they are
identical to criminal statutes that prohibit conduct such as copy-
ing a key27 or entering real property without causing damage.27 2
Second, the mere access statute must be coupled with a
"wiretapping" provision criminalizing use of national or interna-
tional telephone lines to commit a computer offense. Such a pro-
vision is necessary because the telephone lines are needed not
only to obtain unauthorized access, but also to obtain authorized
access.
273
OECD explains that a "premium" may be granted to well-
intentioned hackers who gain unauthorized access to computer
systems in order to illustrate the lack of security.274 This "pre-
mium" may take the form of special consideration at the time of
prosecution and would apply only to hackers who give immedi-
ate notice to the victim or to the appropriate state authorities of
their illicit access and of the loopholes they discovered.275 Such a
provision might benefit computer owners in that hackers will not
feel restricted in their self-imposed mission to find and point out
security flaws. The downfall of the "premium" is that it fails to
address the invasion of privacy and property that results when
an unauthorized user obtains access to a system. Furthermore,
hackers might be tricked into a false sense of security by believ-
ing their activities are covered under the "premium" only to
learn that their well-intentioned intrusion caused damage, there-
fore falling within the full realm of prosecutorial penalties under
''means" statutes.
Third, a specific statutory provision criminalizing alteration
or destruction of data must be included.27 16 Two examples of
such a provision are found with the Canadian Mischief in Rela-
270 OECD, supra note 265, at 60-63.
271 See, e.g., Id. at 61 (citing C. PEN., § 399 (France)).
... OECD, supra note 265, at 61.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 63. It is worth noting that Canada, the United States and the United King-
dom do not have statutory provisions providing leniency for well-intentioned hackers in
their "means" statutes. See Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985, Act of June 20 1985,
ch. C-19, § 301.2, 1985 Can. Stat. 272 (Canadian Unauthorized Use of Computer Stat-
ute); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988); Computer Misuse Act,
1990, ch. 18.
27. OECD, supra note 265, at 63.
270 Id. at 39.
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tion to Data Statute27 and the English Computer Misuse Act of
1990.278
In addition to "means"-oriented solutions, modification or
creation of statutory provisions attacking the "ends" of hacking
also must be passed with the inclusion of computer data in the
definition of "property. 2 79 The most common "ends" statutes in
need of modification are those dealing with theft,28" 0 larceny, em-
bezzlement and credit card fraud.281
A further type of "ends" statutes in need of modification
are those dealing with fraud. Fraud provisions must be modified
or created to include computer fraud.2 82 OECD has suggested
that fraud statutes criminalize "the manipulation of data with
the intent to deprive another in order to gain illegal
profit ... .283
Additional "ends" statutes in need of modification are those
dealing with treason.284 Treason statutes should specifically pro-
tect "[s]ensitive military, technological and diplomatic informa-
tion . . ",285 An anti-hacking treason provision would penalize
hackers who access government computers containing informa-
tion regarding national security. "
Finally, both "means" and "ends" statutes must express
definitions in terms of function, rather than technology, in order
to remain current with the rapidly-changing technological ad-
vancements of computer hardware and software.287
b. Collective - International
Two general principles required by the international com-
munity are: an international unification of efforts to keep trans-
border data flows2 8 8 moving freely; and the protection of per-
277 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
278 See Appendix.
27. OECD, supra note 265, at 40-43.
2" This should also include theft of trade secrets via computer. Id. at 47.
211 Id. at 39-40.
282 Id. at 39.
283 Id.
.. Id. at 46.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 40.
" See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR EcONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE-
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sonal data collected about individuals. 289 Further, OECD's
stated policy dictates that international economic transactions
be protected.29
"The development of data bank interconnections via inter-
national telecommunications networks brings an international
dimension to computer-related crime. "291 A person at a terminal
in country A could manipulate a program or access a computer
in country B, and through such conduct affect the interests in
Country C. 292
The territorial principle dictates jurisdiction in the circum-
stances specified above.293 That is, the applicable law is that of
the country in which the offense or one of its elements is alleged
to have occurred.2 94 It is apparent that the hacking problem af-
fects the territorial principle because an element of an offense
may occur in all three countries, thus creating trilateral jurisdic-
tion. In addition, the principle of "Non bis in idem ' '295 is appli-
cable. OECD suggests that these problems be addressed by coor-
dinating international efforts.
One solution to the global hacking problem is incorporating
clear jurisdictional provisions into computer statutes. 96 Besides
the English Computer Misuse Act,297 an example of such a juris-
dictional provision can be found in a currently existing Scottish
"means" statute.298
The jurisdictional section of this Scottish statute grants ju-
risdiction to Scotland to try an offender "[w]here the offences
... are committed partly in Scotland and partly in another
country . . . irrespective of whether at the material time he was
LINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA
(1981).
2189 See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108.
290 OECD, supra note 265, at 2.
Id. at 66
292 Id.
'3 Id.
294 Id.
291 "Not twice for the same; that is, a man shall not be twice tried for the same
crime." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 948 (5th ed. 1979).
29 OECD, supra note 265, at 66-67.
297 See Appendix.
298 See Scottish Law Commission: Report on Computer Crime, 4 COMPUTER L. &
PRAC. 27, 28 (1987).
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himself in Scotland or in that other country." 9
Second, international efforts may be coordinated by clearly
stating provisions for choice of law and extradition proce-
dures. 300 Such provisions will give hackers the impression that a
unified front among nations is against them.
Third, international efforts may be coordinated through ex-
pansion of extradition treaties to specifically include computer
offenses as extraditable.301 Extradition treaties should be written
in such a manner to obligate extradition if a warrant is issued
and the offense is a felony.3 0 2
Finally, international efforts must be coordinated through
mutual assistance between countries.0 Mutual assistance con-
cerns the investigation of alleged hacking offenses and includes
such elements as search and seizure, service of documents, or the
taking of testimony or statements of citizens of other nations.304
In short, "[t]hese issues deserve further consideration by
Member countries 30 5 and appropriate international bodies. 30 6
"[I]nternational co-operation in repressing and controlling
[hacking] activity ..."307 is necessary. The most forceful type
of international cooperation would be a specific convention
prohibiting hacking. However, such a convention is not neces-
sary if each nation alters its existing treaties.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The global hacking phenomenon is illustrated by the Aus-
tralian arrests of April 2, 1990.308 The case is a prime example of
the level of international cooperation necessary to combat hack-
ing effectively. In that incident, computers within the United
299 Id.
300 OECD, supra note 265, at 67.
301 Id.
302 Id.
SOS Id. at 68.
304 Id. An example of this mutual assistance is again illustrated by the recent Aus-
tralian incident. The authorities of Australia and the United States cooperated in appre-
hending the hackers who damaged computer systems in the United States from Austra-
lia. Global Peril, supra note 2.
30. See OECD, supra note 265, at 2 for a list of OECD Member countries.
'" Id. at 70.
307 Id.
300 See supra text accompanying notes 1-14.
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States were damaged by hackers operating out of Australia. In
prosecuting the hackers, the United States cooperated with Aus-
tralian authorities. Once the hackers were traced, the Australian
authorities charged the hackers with an offense under Australian
law.
The incident illustrates the problems with current hacking
statutes. If Australia did not have a specific hacking statute, the
hackers would have been beyond prosecution unless the United
States sought extradition. The problem with relying upon extra-
dition is twofold: 1) the principle of double criminality and 2)
tracing the hackers without Australian assistance. In absence of
a hacking statute, Australian police would lack investigatory ju-
risdiction and United States authorities could not rely upon
Australian assistance to extradite the hackers. Further, the
United States could not even request extradition of the Austra-
lian citizens even though hacking is illegal in the United States
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
The exact dilemma stated above has presented itself in the
most recent Dutch hacking incident. In that incident, Dutch
hackers penetrated United States computers hooked to Internet.
The hackers caused no damage in their escapade, and the
Netherlands has no law prohibiting the "means" of hacking.
Therefore the United States can not reach the hackers in the
Netherlands.30 9
The suggested solutions by OECD will solve the above-men-
tioned problems. If every nation passes a specific computer stat-
ute against hacking in accordance with the OECD guidelines
calling for extradition and mutual assistance clauses, the
problems would not exist and investigations similar to that in
the Australian/United States incident would be common.
However, because international cooperation is still but a
dream, domestic law is the sole source of prosecuting the com-
puter crime of hacking. Of the three systems examined, Can-
ada's is the strongest domestically because it has modified
"ends" statutes to attack the damages resulting from hacking.
Canada also attacks the "means" of hacking and punishes hack-
ers who do not necessarily cause any damage when they pene-
trate computer systems.
'" See Dutch Rogues, supra note 8.
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The United States system is adequate for attacking hacking
on a domestic level. The United States does not attack the
"ends" of hacking as effectively as the Canadian system because
its "ends" property statutes do not specifically include hacking
damage as criminal. The United States attacks hacking primar-
ily through its "means" statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act. However, that statute is not as strong as it could be because
it is federal and thus does not criminalize hacking within state
boundaries. The statute also does not define key terms: hence
there is room for potential ambiguities to be litigated. Finally
the statute does not account for future technological changes.
Nevertheless, the statute to date has been successful in convict-
ing at least one computer hacker.
Finally, the United Kingdom's domestic system in attacking
the "ends" of hacking is weak because its property statutes do
not include computer offenses. The United Kingdom's "means"
statute, The Computer Misuse Act, is powerful, however, in pro-
tecting the United Kingdom from both domestic and interna-
tional hackers. The United Kingdom's "means" statute, interna-
tionally, has provisions providing for extradition, double
criminality and mutual assistance. Such a statute is necessary
in attacking hacking on a global level. Other countries could
benefit from following the United Kingdom's statutory example.
Domestically, the United Kingdom potentially protects per-
sonal data from hacking invasions through the Data Protection
Act. This Act compels holders of personal information to ade-
quately secure their computer systems and could eliminate a
hacker's self-proclaimed mission of exposing security flaws. The
problem with such an Act is that it could result in victim's con-
cealing hacking incidents, rather than the conquering of hacking
offenses.
On an international level, the only convention that ap-
plies-the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Re-
gard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data-relies on the
same theory as the United Kingdom's Data Protection Act. The
theory is that the responsibility lies with the holder of informa-
tion to protect the information from hackers. Within a single
country that theory may be sound, but again, the international
hacking problem is not addressed. Only a three-prong attack
with combined "ends," "means," and data protection laws man-
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dating security will effectively eliminate hacking on a global
scale.
On a final note, hacking is a global crime unlike one that
was ever experienced. The linking of the world through common
networks has created the problem. The only effective resolutions
are: 1) to sever the international connection; or 2) to keep the
world linked and cooperate to prevent the abuses that result.
The world has the choice.
ROBERT J. SCIGLIMPAGLIA, JR.
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APPENDIX
COMPUTER MISUSE ACT, 1990, CH. 18.
The following is the full text of the English Computer Mis-
use Act which was passed on June 29, 1990 and went into force
on August 29, 1990.
SECTION: Long Title
Text:
An Act to make provision for securing computer material
against unauthorised access or modification; and for connected
purposes.
SECTION: 1 Unauthorised access to computer material
Text:
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if-
(a) he causes a computer to perform any function with in-
tent to secure access to any program or data held in computer;
(b) the access he intends to secure is unauthorised; and
(c) he knows at the time when he causes the computer to
perform the function that that is the case.
(2) The intent a person has to have to commit an offence
under this section need not be directed at-
(a) any particular program or data;
(b) a program or data of any particular kind; or
(c) a program or data held in any particular computer.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be
liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on a stan-
dard scale or to both.
SECTION: 2 Unauthorised access with intent to commit or fa-
cilitate commission of further offences
Text:
(1) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he
commits an offence under section 1 above ("the unauthorised ac-
cess offence") with intent-
(a) to commit an offence to which this section applies; or
(b) to facilitate the commission of such an offence (whether
by himself or by any other person);
and the offence he intends to commit or facilitate is referred
to below in this section as the further offence.
(2) This section applies to offences-
(a) for which the sentence is fixed by law; or
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(b) for which a person of twenty-one years of age or over
(not previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment
for a term of five years (or, in England and Wales, might be so
sentenced but for the restrictions imposed by section 33 of the
Magistrates' Courts Act 1980).
(3) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether
the further offence is to be committed on the same occasion as
the unauthorised access offence or on any future occasion.
(4) A person may be guilty of an offence under this section
even though the facts are such that the commission of the fur-
ther offence is impossible.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be
liable-
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory
maximum or to both; and
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years or to a fine or to both.
SECTION: 3 Unauthorised modification of computer material
Text:
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if-
(a) he does any act which causes an unauthorised modifica-
tion of the contents of any computer; and
(b) at the time when he does the act he has the requisite
intent and the requisite knowledge.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above the requisite
intent is an intent to cause a modification of the contents of any
computer and by so doing-
(a) to impair the operation of any computer;
(b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held
in any computer; or
(c) to impair the operation of any such program or the relia-
bility of any such data.
(3) The intent need not be directed at-
(a) any particular computer;
(b) any particular program or data or a program or data of
any particular kind; or
(c) any particular modification or a modification of any par-
ticular kind.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above the requisite
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knowledge is knowledge that any modification he intends to
cause is unauthorised.
(5) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether
an unauthorised modification or any intended effect of it of a
kind mentioned in subsection (2) above is, or is intended to be,
permanent or merely temporary.
(6) For the purposes of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 a
modification of the contents of a computer shall not regarded as
damaging any computer or computer storage medium unless its
effect on that computer or computer storage medium impairs its
physical condition.
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be
liable-
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory
maximum or to both; and
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years or to a fine or to both.
SECTION: 4 Territorial scope of offences under this Act
Text:
(1) Except as provided below in this section, it is immaterial
for the purposes of any offence under section I or 3 above-
(a) whether any act or other event proof of which is re-
quired for conviction of the offence occurred in the home coun-
try concerned; or
(b) whether the accused was in the home country concerned
at the time of any such act or event.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, in the case of such an
offence at least one significant link with domestic jurisdiction
must exist in the circumstances of the case for the offence to be
committed.
(3) There is no need for any such link to exist for the com-
mission of an offence under section 1 above to be established in
proof of an allegation to that effect in proceedings for an offence
under section 2 above.
(4) Subject to section 8 below, where-
(a) any such link does in fact exist in the case of an offence
under section 1 above; and
(b) commission of that offence is alleged in proceedings for
an offence under section 2 above;
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section 2 above shall apply as if anything the accused in-
tended to do or facilitate in any place outside the home country
concerned which would be an offence to which section 2 applies
if it took place in the home country concerned were the offence
in question.
(5) This section is without prejudice to any jurisdiction ex-
ercisable by a court in Scotland apart from this section.
(6) References in this Act to the home country concerned
are references-
(a) in the application of this Act to England and Wales, to
England and Wales;
(b) in the application of this Act to Scotland, to Scotland;
and
(c) in the application of this Act to Northern Ireland, to
Northern Ireland.
SECTION: 5 Significant links with domestic jurisdiction
Text:
(1) The following provisions of this section apply for the in-
terpretation of section 4 above.
(2) In relation to an offence under section 1, either of the
following is a significant link with domestic jurisdiction-
(a) .that the accused was in the home country concerned at
the time when he did the act which caused the computer to per-
form the function; or
(b) that any computer containing any program or data to
which the accused secured or intended to secure unauthorised
access by doing that act was in the home country concerned at
the time.
(3) In relation to an offence under section 3, either of the
following is a significant link with domestic jurisdiction-
(a) that the accused was in the home country concerned at
the time when he did the act which caused the unauthorised
modification; or
(b) that the unauthorised modification took place in the
home country concerned.
SECTION: 6 Territorial scope of inchoate offences related to of-
fences under this Act
Text:
(1) On a charge of conspiracy to commit an offence under
this Act the following questions are immaterial to the accused's
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guilt-
(a) the question where any person became a party to the
conspiracy; and
(b) the question whether any act, omission or other event
occurred in the home country concerned.
(2) On a charge of attempting to commit an offense under
section 3 above the following questions are immaterial to the ac-
cused's guilt-
(a) the question where the attempt was made; and
(b) the question whether it had an effect in the home coun-
try concerned.
(3) On a charge of incitement to commit an offence under
this Act the question where the incitement took place is immate-
rial to the accused's guilt.
(4) This section does not extend to Scotland.
SECTION: 7 Territorial scope of inchoate offences related to of-
fences under external law corresponding to offences under this
Act.
Text:
(1)-(3)...
(4) Subject to section 8 below, if any act done by- a person in
England and Wales would amount to the offence of incitement
to commit an offence under this Act but for the fact that what
he had in view would not be an offence triable in England and
Wales-(a) what he had in view shall be treated as an offence
under this Act for the purposes of any charge of incitement
brought in respect of that act; and
(b) any such charge shall accordingly be triable in England
and Wales.
ANNOTATIONS:
Sub-ss (1), (2): amend the Criminal Law Act 1977, s.1.
Sub-s (3): amends the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s.1.
SECTION: 8 Relevance of external law
Text:
(1) A person is guilty of an offence triable by virtue of sec-
tion 4(4) above only if what he intended to do or facilitate would
involve the commission of an offence under the law in force
where the whole or any part of it was intended to take place.
(2) A person is guilty of an offence triable by virtue of sec-
tion 1(1A) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 only if the pursuit of
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the agreed course of conduct would at some state involve-
(a) an act or omission by one or more of the parties; or
(b) the happening of some other event;
constituting an offence under the law in force where the act,
omission or other event was intended to take place.
(3) A person is guilty of an offence triable by virtue of sec-
tion (1A) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 or by virtue of
section 7(4) above only if what he had in view would involve the
commission of an offence under the law in force where the whole
or part of it was intended to take place.
(4) Conduct punishable under the law in force in any place
is an offence under that law for the purposes of this section,
however it is described in that law.
(5) Subject to subsection (7) below, a condition specified in
any of subsections (1) to (3) above shall be taken to be satisfied
unless not later than rules of court may provide the defence
serve on the prosecution a notice-
(a) stating that, on the facts as alleged with respect to the
relevant conduct, the condition is not in their opinion satisfied;
(b) showing their grounds for that opinion; and
(c) requiring the prosecution to show that it is satisfied.
(6) In subsection (5) above "the relevant conduct" means-
(a) where the condition in subsection (1) above is in ques-
tion, what the accused intended to do or facilitate;
(b) where the condition in subsection (2) above is in ques-
tion, the agreed course of conduct; and
(c) where the condition in subsection (3) above is in ques-
tion, what the accused had in view.
(7) The court, if it thinks fit, may permit the defence to re-
quire the prosecution to show that the condition is satisfied
without the prior service of a notice under subsection (5) above.
(8) If by virtue of subsection (7) above a court of solemn
jurisdiction in Scotland permits the defence to require the pros-
ecution to show that the condition is satisfied, it shall be compe-
tent for the prosecution for that purpose to examine any witness
or to put in evidence any production not included in the lists
lodged by it.
(9) In the Crown Court the question whether the condition
is satisfied shall be decided by the judge alone.
(10) In the High Court of Justiciary and in the sheriff court
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the question whether the condition is satisfied shall be decided
by the judge or, as the case may be, the sheriff alone.
SECTION: 9 British citizenship immaterial
Text:
(1) In any proceedings brought in England and Wales in re-
spect of any offence to which this section applies it is immaterial
to guilt whether or not the accused was a British citizen at the
time of any act, omission or other event proof of which is re-
quired for conviction of the offence.
(2) This section applies to the following offences-
(a) any offence under this Act;
(b) conspiracy to commit an offence under this Act;
(c) any attempt to commit an offence under section 3 above;
and
(d) incitement to commit an offence under this Act.
SECTION: 10 Saving for certain law enforcement powers
Text:
Section 1(1) above has effect without prejudice to the
operation-
(a) in England and Wales of any enactment relating to pow-
ers of inspection, search or seizure; and
(b) in Scotland of any enactment or rule of law relating to
powers of examination, search or seizure.
SECTION: 11 Proceedings for offences under section 1
Text:
(1) A magistrates' court shall have jurisdiction to try an of-
fence under section 1 above if-
(a) the accused was within its commission area at the time
when he did the act which caused the computer to perform the
function; or
(b) any computer containing any program or data to which
the accused secured or intended to secure unauthorised access
by doing that act was in its commission area at that time.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, proceedings for an of-
fence under section 1 above may be brought within a period of
six months from the date on which evidence sufficient in the
opinion of the prosecutor to warrant the proceedings came to his
knowledge.
(3) No such proceedings shall be brought by virtue of this
section more than three years after the commission of the
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offence.
(4) For the purposes of this section, a certificate signed by
or on behalf of the prosecutor and stating the date on which
evidence sufficient in his opinion to warrant the proceedings
came to his knowledge shall be conclusive evidence of that fact.
(5) A certificate stating that matter and purporting to be so
signed shall be deemed to be so signed unless the contrary is
proved.
(6) In this section "commission area" has the same meaning
as in the Justices of the Peace Act 1979.
(7) This section does not extend to Scotland.
SECTION: 12 Conviction of an offence under section 1 and in
proceedings for an offence under section 2 or 3
Text:
(1) If on the trial on indictment of a person charged
with-(a) an offence under section 2 above; or
(b) an offence under section 3 above or any attempt to com-
mit such an offence;
the jury find him not guilty of the offence charged, they
may find him guilty of an offence under section 1 above if on the
facts shown he could have been found guilty of that offence in
proceedings for that offence brought before the expiry of any
time limit under section 11 above applicable to such
proceedings.
(2) The Crown Court shall have the same powers and duties
in relation to a person who is by virtue of this section convicted
before it of an offence under section 1 above as a magistrates'
court would have on convicting him of the offence.
(3) This section is without prejudice to section 6(3) of the
Criminal Law Act 1967 (conviction of alternative indictable of-
fence on trial on indictment).
(4) This section does not extend to Scotland.
SECTION: 13 Proceedings in Scotland
Text:
(1) A sheriff shall have jurisdiction in respect of an offence
under section 1 or 2 above if-
(a) the accused was in the sheriffdom at the time when he
did the act which caused the computer to perform the function;
or
(b) any computer containing any program or data to which
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the accused secured or intended to secure unauthorised access
by doing that act was in the sheriffdom at that time.
(2) A sheriff shall have jurisdiction in respect of an offence
under section 3 above if-
(a) the accused was in the sheriffdom at the time when he
did the act which caused the unauthorised modification; or
(b) the unauthorised modification took place in the
sheriffdom.
(3) Subject to subsection (4) below, summary proceedings
for an offence under section 1, 2 or 3 above may be commenced
within a period six months from the date on which evidence suf-
ficient in the opinion of the procurator fiscal to warrant proceed-
ings came to his knowledge.
(4) No such proceedings shall be commenced by virtue of
this section more than three years after the commission of the
offence.
(5) For the purposes of this section, a certificate signed by
or on behalf of the procurator fiscal and stating the date on
which evidence sufficient in his opinion to warrant the proceed-
ings came to his knowledge shall be conclusive evidence of that
fact.
(6) A certificate stating that matter and purporting to be so
signed shall be deemed to be so signed unless the contrary is
proved.
(7) Subsection (3) of section 331 of the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1975 (date of commencement of proceedings)
shall apply for the purposes of this section as it applies for the
purposes of that section.
(8) In proceedings in which a person is charged with an of-
fence under section 2 or 3 above and is found not guilty or is
acquitted of that charge, he may be found guilty of an offence
under section 1 above if on the facts shown he could have been
found guilty of that offence in proceedings for that offence com-
menced before the expiry of any time limit under this section
applicable to such proceedings.
(9) Subsection (8) above shall apply whether or not an of-
fence under section 1 above has been libelled in the complaint or
indictment.
(10) A person found guilty of an offence under section 1
above by virtue of subsection (8) above shall be liable, in respect
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of that offence, only to the penalties set out in section 1.
(11) This section extends to Scotland only.
SECTION: 14 Search warrants for offences under section 1
Text:
(1) Where a circuit judge is satisfied by information on oath
given by a constable that there are reasonable grounds for
believing-
(a) that an offence under section 1 above has been or is
about to be committed in any premises; and
(b) that evidence that such an offence has been or is about
to be committed is in those premises;
he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and
search the premises, using such reasonable force as is necessary.
(2) The power conferred by subsection (1) above does not
extend to authorising a search for material of the kinds men-
tioned in section 9(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984 (privileged, excluded and special procedure material).
(3) A warrant under this section-
(a) may authorise persons to accompany any constable exe-
cuting the warrant; and
(b) remains in force for twenty-eight days from the date of
its issue.
(4) In exercising a warrant issued under this section a con-
stable may seize an article if he reasonably believes that it is
evidence that an offence under section 1 above has been or is
about to be committed.
(5) In this section "premises" includes land, buildings, mov-
able structures, vehicles, vessels, aircraft and hovercraft.
(6) This section does not extend to Scotland.
SECTION: 15 Extradition where Schedule 1 to the Extradition
Act 1989 applies
Text:
The offences to which an Order in Council under section 2
of the Extradition Act 1870 can apply shall include-
(a) offences under section 2 or 3 above;
(b) any conspiracy to commit such an offence; and
(c) any attempt to commit an offence under section 3 above.
SECTION: 16 Application to Northern Ireland
Text:
(1) The following provisions of this section have effect for
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applying this Act in relation to Northern Ireland with the modi-
fications there mentioned.
(2) In section 2(2)(b)-
(a) the reference to England and Wales shall be read as a
reference to Northern Ireland; and
(b) the reference to section 33 of the Magistrates' Courts
Act 1980 shall be read as a reference to Article 46(4) of the Mag-
istrates' Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981.
(3) The reference in section 3(6) to the Criminal Damage
Act 1971 shall be read as a reference to the Criminal Damage
(Northern Ireland) Order 1977.
(4) Subsections (5) to (7) below apply in substitution for
subsections (1) to (3) of section 7; and any reference in subsec-
tion (4) of that section to England and Wales shall be read as a
reference to Northern Ireland.
(5) The following paragraphs shall be inserted after para-
graph (1) of Article 9 of the Criminal Attempts and Conspiracy
(Northern Ireland) Order 1983-
"(1A) Subject to section 8 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990
(relevance of external law), if this paragraph applies to an agree-
ment, this Part has effect in relation to it as it has effect in rela-
tion to an agreement falling within paragraph (1).
(1B) Paragraph (1A) applies to an agreement if-
(a) a party to it, or a party's agent, did anything in North-
ern Ireland in relation to it before its formation;
(b) a party to it became a party in Northern Ireland (by
joining it either in person or through an agent); or
(c) a party to it, or a party's agent, did or omitted anything
in Northern Ireland in pursuance of it;
and the agreement would fall within paragraph (1) as an
agreement relating to the commission of a computer misuse of-
fence but for the fact that the offence would not be an offence
triable in Northern Ireland if committed in accordance with the
parties' intentions.". [sic]
(6) The following paragraph shall be inserted after para-
graph (4) of that Article-
"(5) In the application of this Part to an agreement to
which paragraph (1A) applies any reference to an offence shall
be read as a reference to what would be the computer misuse
offence in question but for the fact that it is not an offence tria-
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ble in Northern Ireland.
(6) In this Article "computer misuse offence" means an of-
fence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.".[sic]
(7) The following paragraphs shall be inserted after Article
3(1) of that Order-
"(1A) Subject to section 8 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990
(relevance of external law), if this paragraph applies to an act,
what the person doing it had in view shall be treated as an of-
fence to which this Article applies.
(1B) Paragraph (1A) above applies to an act if-
(a) it is done in Northern Ireland; and
(b) it would fall within paragraph (1) as more than merely
preparatory to the commission of an offence under section 3 of
the Computer Misuse Act 1990 but for the fact that the offence,
if completed, would not be an offence triable in Northern
Ireland.". [sic]
(8) In section 8-
(a) the reference in subsection (2) to section 1(1A) of the
Criminal Law Act 1977 shall be read as a reference to Article
9(1A) of that Order; and
(b) the reference in subsection (3) to section (1A) of the
Criminal Attempts Act 1981 shall be read as a reference to Arti-
cle 3(1A) of that Order.
(9) The references in section 9(1) and 10 to England and
Wales shall be read as references to Northern Ireland.
(10) In section 11, for subsection (1) there shall be
substituted-
"(1) A magistrates' court for a county division in Northern
Ireland may hear and determine a complaint charging an offence
under section 1 above or conduct a preliminary investigation or
preliminary inquiry into an offence under that section if-
(a) the accused was in that division at the time when he did
the act which caused the computer to perform the function; or
(b) any computer containing any program or data to which
the accused secured or intended to secure unauthorised access
by doing that act was in that division at that time.";
and subsection (6) shall be omitted.
(11) The reference in section 12(3) to section 6(3) of the
Criminal Law Act 1967 shall be read as a reference to section
6(2) of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967.
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(12) In section 14-
(a) the reference in subsection (1) to a circuit judge shall be
read as a reference to a county court judge; and
(b) the reference in subsection (2) to section 9(2) of the Po-
lice and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 shall be read as a reference
to Article 11(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern
Ireland) Order 1989.
ANNOTATIONS:
Sub-ss (5)-(7): amend SI 1983 No 1120, arts 3, 9.
SECTION: 17 Interpretation
Text:
(1) The following provisions of this section apply for the in-
terpretation of this Act.
(2) A person secures access to any program or data held in a
computer if by causing a computer to perform any function he-
(a) alters or erases the program or data;
(b) copies or moves it to any storage medium other than
that in which it is held or to a different location in the storage
medium in which it is held;
(c) uses it; or
(d) has it output from the computer in which it is held
(whether by having it displayed or in any other manner);
and references to access to a program or data (and to an
intent to secure such access) shall be read accordingly.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(c) above a person
uses a program if the function he causes the computer to per-
form-(a) causes the program to be executed; or
(b) is itself a function of the program.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(d) above-
(a) a program is output if the instructions of which it con-
sists are output; and
(b) the form in which any such instructions or any other
data is output (and in particular whether or not it represents a
form in which, in the case of instructions, they are capable of
being executed or, in the case of data, it is capable of being
processed by a computer) is immaterial.
(5) Access of any kind by any person to any program or data
held in a computer is unauthorised if-
(a) he is not himself entitled to control access of the kind in
question to the program or data; and
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(b) he does not have consent to access by him of the kind in
question to the program or data from any person who is so
entitled.
(6) References to any program or data held in a computer
include references to any program or data held in any removable
storage medium which is for the time being in the computer; and
a computer is to be regarded as containing any program or data
held in any such medium.
(7) A modification of the contents of any computer takes
place if, by the operation of any function of the computer con-
cerned or any other computer-
(a) any program or data held in the computer concerned is
altered or erased; or
(b) any program or data is added to its contents;
and any act which contributes towards causing such a modi-
fication shall be regarded as causing it.
(8) Such a modification is unauthorised if-
(a) the person whose act causes it is not himself entitled to
determine whether the modification should be made; and
(b) he does not have consent to the modification from any
person who is so entitled.
(9) References to the home country concerned shall be read
in accordance with section 4(6) above.
(10) References to a program include references to part of a
program.
SECTION: 18 Citation, commencement etc
Text:
(1) This Act may be cited as the Computer Misuse Act 1990
(2) This Act shall come into force at the end of the period of
two months beginning with the day on which it is passed.
(3) An offence is not committed under this Act unless every
act or other event proof of which is required for conviction of
the offence takes place after this Act comes into force.
Computer Misuse Act, 1990, ch. 18 (Lexis, International library,
U.K. file).
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